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ABSTRACT  
   
Baruch de Spinoza (1632-1677) is most often treated as a secular philosopher in 
the literature. But the critical-historical and textual analyses explored in this study 
suggest that Spinoza wrote the Ethics not as a secular project intended to supersede 
monotheism for those stoic enough to plumb its icy depths, but rather, and as is much less 
often assumed, as a genuinely Judeo-Christian theological discourse accounting for the 
changing scientific worldviews and political realities of his time. This paper draws upon 
scholarship documenting Spinoza's involvement with Christian sects such as the 
Collegiants and Quakers. After establishing the largely unappreciated importance of 
Spinoza's religious or theological thought, a close reading of the Ethics demonstrates that 
friendship is the theme that ties together Spinoza's ethical, theological, political, and 
scientific doctrines. 
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CHAPTER 1 
AN ENEMY OF RELIGION? 
It is of the first importance to men to establish close relationships and to bind 
themselves together with such ties as may most effectively unite them into one 
body, and, as an absolute rule, to act in such a way as serves to strengthen 
friendship. 
—Baruch de Spinoza, Ethics  
Some three and a half centuries of a wide-variety of interpretations of Baruch de 
Spinoza (1632-1677) have obscured some important aspects of his philosophy. The 
literature has tended to portray him as a cold and secular rationalist as well as an ascetic 
and perhaps eccentric recluse.
1
 However, Spinoza was actually intensely passionate about 
both religion and the nature of true friendship. Textual and biographical evidence reveal a 
man who continuously meditated upon Scripture as well as upon natural law. Judeo-
Christian values were of primary significance to Spinoza, and in the Ethics he dares—
using the tools of the natural philosophy of his day—to establish the foundations in 
natural law.  
The evidence clearly shows that Spinoza was a very sociable person who was a 
deeply committed and caring friend. In order to understand the spirit of friendship in 
Spinoza’s philosophy, this study examines the historical contexts and biographical details 
from which it was drawn and looks closely at key passages from his writings, especially 
the appendix and the twentieth through the fortieth propositions of Part 4 of the Ethics. 
 Spinoza’s use of terms in the Ethics such as substance, attribute, mode, affection, 
essence, God’s understanding Love, God’s Idea, and Friendship are interpreted 
                                                 
1
 See, e.g.: Yirmiyahu Yovel, Spinoza and Other Heretics, Vol. 1: The Marrano of Reason (New 
Jersey & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1989), 31. 
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consistently and coherently as philosophical terms in their historical context.
2
 Likewise, 
popular aphoristic propositions and phrases from the Ethics have most often been treated 
primarily as philosophical concepts and seldom as biblical interpretations.
3
 Consequently, 
Spinoza has been treated as a philosopher in general or, more specifically, as a 
philosopher of mind or as a Jewish philosopher.
4
 This study questions whether the quasi-
mythological aspect of these terms and phrases actually have a primarily religious 
function for Spinoza. Although the Ethics indeed represents a departure from traditional 
Judeo-Christian theology as generally understood at that time, and one that draws upon 
divers intellectual heterodox as well as orthodox resources, the evidence presented here 
suggests that Spinoza wrote the Ethics not as a secular project intended to supersede 
monotheism for those stoic enough to plumb its icy depths, but rather, and as is much less 
often assumed, as a genuinely Judeo-Christian theological discourse accounting for the 
changing scientific worldviews and political realities of his time.
5
  
                                                 
2
 The first three examples (substance, attribute, and mode) are treated of most frequently in the 
literature. Friendship (amicitia or Amicitia) is much less frequently mentioned, despite its importance. 
“God’s understanding Love” is Wienpahl’s translation of Dei Amor intellectualis in Paul Wienpahl, The 
Radical Spinoza (New York: New York University Press, 1979). Shirley’s translation of the same is “the 
intellectual love of God” in Baruch Spinoza, Spinoza: Complete Works (Samuel Shirley, tr.; Michael L. 
Morgan, ed./intro.; Indianapolis & Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2002). 
3
 For a treatment of this problem as it relates, by way of example, to E1p15, “Everything which is, 
is in God and can neither be nor be conceived without God,” see Warren Montag, “‘That Hebrew Word’: 
Spinoza and the Concept of Shekhinah,” in Jewish Themes in Spinoza’s Philosophy (Heidi M. Ravven and 
Lenn E. Goodman, eds.; Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002, pp. 131-144), 137-142. 
4
 See Heidi M. Ravven and Lenn E. Goodman, eds., Jewish Themes in Spinoza’s Philosophy 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002). 
5
 For an overview of intellectual changes that came about in Europe through colonial contact and 
scientific developments, see Franklin Perkins, Leibniz and China: A commerce of light (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004). See also the Introduction by Allison P. Coudert and Taylor Corse in 
Anne Conway, The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy (Allison P. Coudert & Taylor 
Corse, trs./eds.; Cambridge, UK & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), xiii-xv.   
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 Committed to empirical science and the kind of reasoning available to ordinary 
human minds, Spinoza drew from a wide variety of sources, both scientific and 
experiental, to present a picture of a universe governed by a non-anthropomorphic deity 
whose essence is partially available to human knowledge rather than being completely 
inscrutable. Although Spinoza’s God, as he is in himself, may not be fully comprehended 
by anyone other than God himself, he can nevertheless be comprehended to some extent 
by human beings, depending on the extent of their knowledge of modern logic, modern 
science, and possibly even by the history of philosophy. But this knowledge is always 
incomplete. The limitation is human finitude. Challenging traditional Aristotelian logic, 
Spinoza argued that clear and distinct knowledge of God is available to every reasonable 
person, even though such knowledge is always intuited by finite beings in the very midst 
of God’s infinitely indeterminate actuality. 
Spinoza counts any and all knowledge of the self-apparent laws of nature as 
knowledge of God. He found ample material from Scripture to support his view. 
Whatever in Scripture did not support this new immanent view of God, however, Spinoza 
dismissed as “superstitions”—explanations useful in the past, before science dominated 
cosmology, but now seen to be erroneous in the early modern world. Thus, Spinoza 
argued, hanging on to outdated superstitious views was anathema to scientifically 
approaching knowledge of God and living an ethical life based upon such knowledge.  
In the final analysis, the theology Spinoza circumscribed in the Ethics goes way 
beyond anything previously presented in his ancient and medieval Jewish, Muslim, and 
Christian sources. For present purposes, it is one that relies significantly upon a notion of 
friendship found in the Hebrew Scriptures. Although approached with scientific rigor, 
  4 
this notion was for Spinoza a divine decree. Thus, whatever else it may be, the Ethics 
stands as a project of traditional Judeo-Christian theological interpretation. 
Spinoza’s new theology was, of course, received with horror by many of his 
contemporaries. Some accused Spinoza of being the Antichrist. A tradition of tussling 
over truncated versions of Spinoza’s theoria ensued. From the time Spinoza’s writings 
began to circulate, these stunted summaries succeeded in convincing much of the general 
public that Spinoza’s new theology was, at bottom, a form of atheism. The story of 
Spinoza’s nihilistic pantheism and its secularizing effects continue to be recounted today 
in volume after volume, even though Spinoza resoundingly claims a strictly Judeo-
Christian religious orientation throughout his tracts and letters. Much in the first three 
chapters of this study addresses this problem, a propaedeutic necessary for a close 
reading of the Ethics in the final two chapters. 
One Dutch compatriot, Johannes Bredenburg (1643-1691), using the same tools 
of Cartesian logic employed by Spinoza, strove in vain to refute Spinoza’s 
necessitarianism. Bredenburg found that he could not in good conscience do anything but 
endorse Spinoza’s conclusions. For religion’s sake, in a move anticipating Kant’s 
separation of theoretical and practical reason, Bredenburg formulated a theory of “double 
truth” pertaining to the divine.6 This satisfied few. “Bredenburg’s Wiskunstige 
demonstratie holds that all consequences and effects in nature are eternally necessary. 
Kuyper, Lemmerman, Orobio de Castro, Aubert de Versé, and countless others 
considered this Spinozistic and redolent of a rigid fatalism incompatible with Revelation 
                                                 
6
 Jonathan I. Israel, Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650-1750 
(Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 355. 
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and Providence.”7 An acrimonious debate, involving religious topics ranging from devils 
to Spinoza’s axiom “nothing can come from nothing” (ex nihilo nihil fit), ensued among 
the Christian Collegiants, splitting the movement in twain between the years 1685 and 
1721.
8
   
Fear of Spinoza was not restricted to the Netherlands. In England, the Cambridge 
Platonists considered Spinoza part of an unholy triumvirate of materialists along with 
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and René Descartes (1596-1650). In France, Bishop Pierre-
Daniel Huet (1630-1721) referred to Spinoza as “insane, illiterate, and stupid”9 and 
recommended that he “be covered with chains and whipped with a rod.”10 In his famous 
Dictionnaire Historique et Critique (1697), Pierre Bayle labeled Spinoza “a strangely 
virtuous systematic atheist.”11 Intent upon refuting the lack of free will and human 
dignity he perceived in Spinoza’s view of God, Leibniz set about constructing a rival 
theological system, the Monadology, published in 1714. And, in the late eighteenth 
century, Kant produced a new version of exactly what Spinoza found repugnant to 
                                                 
7
 Israel, Radical Enlightenment, 354. 
8
 Spinoza’s involvement with the Collegiants is discussed in Ch. 3 of this text. For an account of 
the fate of the sect after Spinoza, see Ch. 19 (The Bredenburg Disputes) in Israel, Radical Enlightenment. 
9
 April G. Shelford, Transforming the Republic of Letters: Pierre-Daniel Huet and European 
Intellectual Life, 1650-1720 (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2007), 155. 
10
 Matthew Stewart, The Courtier and the Heretic: Lebniz, Spinoza, and the Fate of God in the 
Modern World (New York & London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006), 104-105. 
11
 Spinoza, Complete Works, xx (my translation). 
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philosophy: an attempt to ground morality in the human will and in absolute categories 
that are outside of one’s own self-interest.12 
But Spinoza’s reception in the early modern “Republic of Letters” was more than 
simply negative. Starting with his immediate circle of friends that included collaborators, 
co-religionists, and critics as well as his translators and publisher, the circulation of 
Spinoza’s views grew to dominate much of the discourse on religion and morality well 
into the early nineteenth century. A hot and productive rivalry between the 
philosophically-minded scientist, Robert Boyle (1627-1691), and Spinoza was facilitated 
by Henry Oldenburg (c.1619-1677). Boyle authored The Sceptic Chemist and established 
the annual Boyle Lectures as a legacy. Boyle charged the lecturers with disproving 
Spinozism and thereby, as he saw it, preserving traditional Christian values. But Rosalie 
Colie documents how, from its inception through 1730, the divines delivering the Boyle 
Lectures ceded more and more territory to the enemy they were charged to disprove. 
“Spinoza’s heterodoxy, though radical, had become sufficiently domesticated to bear the 
scrutiny of the orthodox, and, almost, their patronage … Philosophy itself became 
orthodoxy—the weapons of metaphysics and physics used to counter deist and mechanist 
arguments became inseparable from [Anglican] orthodoxy itself.”13 Boyle himself 
provided the most scientifically sophisticated arguments from design available during his 
                                                 
12
 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (H. J. Paton, tr.; New York: Harper 
& Row, 1964 [1785]); Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Philosophical Theology (Allen W. Wood, tr./intro.; 
Gertrude M. Clark, tr.; Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1978); and Immanuel Kant, Religion 
within the Boundaries of Mere Reason And Other Writings (Allen Wood and George Di Giovanni, trs. and 
eds.; Robert Merrihew Adams, intro.; Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
13
 Rosalie L. Colie, “Spinoza in England, 1665-1730” (Proceedings of the American Philosophical 
Society, Vol. 107, No. 3, 1963, pp. 183-219), 210. 
  7 
time, but his literalist interpretation of miracles depends upon “a physical process 
analogous to known natural laws” that already approaches Spinoza’s own interpretation 
in the Theological-Political Treatise, and is far removed from the spirited defense of 
divine intervention generally espoused by his compatriots, the Cambridge Platonists.
14
 
Spinoza’s battle for modernist immanent theology over against traditionalist 
transcendent theology became far broader than a struggle between Spinoza and the 
official representatives of the Christian and Jewish communities of the Netherlands. 
Eventually the debate between religious modernism and traditionalism extended to 
encompass most of European civilization.  
A little more than a century after Spinoza, another philosophical battle over the 
new theology was fought in Germany  between Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786), a 
proponent of rational theology, and Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, (1743-1819), a bitter 
enemy of the same and who coined the term, nihilism, specifically to describe any 
version of it. Deeply engaged with the works of Spinoza and other rational theologians, 
Jacobi dedicated himself to characterizing Spinoza as an atheist in disguise and to the 
self-admittedly quixotic mission of rooting Spinozan influences out of German culture.
15
 
The so-called pantheism controversy erupted over an encounter Jacobi described in detail 
between himself and Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-1781), a friend of Mendelssohn 
and respected member of German literary society. Visiting Lessing for the first time, 
                                                 
14
 Colie, “Spinoza in Engliand,” 200 ff. See also Israel, Radical Enlightenment, 456-457 & passim. 
15
 “I know what is in store for me. I stand alone against a whole host and sheep will follow sheep.” 
F. H. Jacobi, Against Mendelssohn’s Accusations, in Gérard Vallée, The Spinoza Conversations Between 
Lessing and Jacobi: Text with Excerpts from the Ensuing Controversy (G. Vallée, J. B. Lawson, & C. G. 
Chapple, trs.; Lanham & London: University Press of America,1988), 159. 
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Jacobi reported grilling his host about his views regarding Spinoza, hoping to win 
Lessing over to his own confessional Christian philosophy based upon a “leap of faith” 
(salto mortale).
16
 Lessing engaged Jacobi in a lengthy conversation about Spinoza, but 
declined endorsing Jacobi’s version of Christian faith. Lessing died shortly thereafter, 
and Jacobi accused Lessing of being an unqualified Spinozist, ergo an atheist. Jacobi was 
thus willing to tarnish Lessing’s reputation in order to use his trumped up errancy as a 
warning to others. A heated and public exchange of letters ensued between Jacobi and 
Mendelssohn. As the acrimony increased, Mendelssohn rushed out in the dead of winter 
to take his latest installment of the debate to press. But, as the story goes, Mendelssohn 
forgot his coat, got ill, and shortly thereafter died. 
In the struggle to reconcile the new theology and traditional Judaism, 
Mendelssohn sought a middle path and was much more sympathetic to Spinoza.
17
 “The 
best minds in Germany [in the last half of the eighteenth century], Mendelssohn 
complained, were concerned with nothing but empirical investigations of the natural 
world. At the same time, a penchant for irrationalism and fanaticism was becoming all 
too prevalent.”18 Defending the reputation of his deceased friend, Lessing, during the 
pantheism controversy, Mendelssohn wrote that “a refined Spinozism … rhymes very 
                                                 
16
 On Jacobi’s philosophy, see B. A. Gerrish, “Faith and Existence in the Philosophy of F. H. 
Jacobi,” in Witness and Existence: Essays in Honor of Schubert M. Ogden (Chicago & London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1989, pp. 106-139). 
17
 “Who would not be delighted to have had Spinoza as friend, no matter how great his 
Spinozism? And who would refuse to give Spinoza’s genius and excellent character their due?” Moses 
Mendelssohn, To the Friends of Lessing, in Vallée, The Spinoza Conversations, 130. 
18
 Allan Arkush, Moses Mendelssohn and the Enlightenment (Albany, NY: State University of 
New York Press, 1994), 69. 
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well with all that is practical in religion and morality” and “can easily be reconciled with 
Judaism.”19 Early in his career Mendelssohn wrote Philosophic Conversations (1755), in 
which Spinoza’s philosophy (but not his biblical criticism) was sympathetically 
critiqued.
20
 By 1783, however, the year in which his Jerusalem or On Religious Power 
and Judaism was published, Mendelssohn was compelled to defend revealed religion 
over and against Spinoza-styled biblical criticism.  
Mendelssohn seems to have had a difficult time accepting Spinoza’s denial of free 
will. Jewish faith, according Mendelssohn, “is constituted not by belief in any doctrine or 
opinion, but by trust in and reliance on the attributes of God.”21 But in Chapter 5 of the 
Mishneh Torah, Maimonides states: “Free Will is bestowed on every human being.”22 
Endorsing, in the final analysis, Maimonides over and against Spinoza, Mendelssohn 
states: “Never in the world would it have occurred to me to look for the freedom of the 
will behind those transcendental terms through which Spinoza attempts to explain it only 
to contest it in his own way.”23 Whatever “transcendental terms” he had in mind, as a 
follower of the Leibniz-Wolff school Mendelssohn could not accept Spinoza’s new 
theology without a fundamental reservation.  
                                                 
19
 Vallée, The Spinoza Conversations, 130. 
20
 Arkush, Moses Mendelssohn, 137. Frederick C. Beiser, The Fate of Reason: German 
Philosophy from Kant to Fichte (Cambridge, MA & London, UK: Harvard University Press, 1987), 52. 
21
 Vallée, The Spinoza Coversations, 149. 
22
 Maimonides, Mishneh Torah (Moses Hyamson, tr./ed.; New York & Palestine: Azriel Printing 
Press), 86b ff. 
23
 Vallée, The Spinoza Coversations, 142. 
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Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) was a philosopher of language, psychology, 
anthropology, science, and theology, a sympathetic reader of Spinoza, and a Protestant 
minister. Herder was an eager student of Kant who later became one of Kant’s bitterest 
critics. The product of Herder’s response to the pantheism controversy was God, Some 
Conversations (1787).  
Herder knew that Spinoza was no crude materialist, and developed a sensualist 
epistemology following the contours of his predecessor’s nominalist program. In 
Herder’s own theology even speech acts (as we now call them) are treated as living 
organisms. This claim is made as a summary of Herder’s work on language in general, 
and this observation about his work in particular: 
[T]he word is the articulating utterance of the typified sense impressions of the 
understanding available to man in the same media through which they were 
received. The products of this utterance bear not only the imprint of their origin, 
that is, the uttered, but equally that of the media of their utterance, that is to say, 
the soul expressing itself in gestures and sounds as an image of the impressions of 
the eyes and ears produces in a new meta-schematism a manifold amalgam whose 
complexity can only be hinted at with the title [of Herder’s text], 
‘Metaschematismus tönender Gedankenbilder’ (Metaschematism of resounding 
thought-images).
24
 
Herder also theorized subject-object cognition in a context of human-human and divine-
human relatedness. Whereas Kant hypostasized cognitive faculties such as pure reason, 
Herder could, following Spinoza, account for the subject-object cognition without any 
such transcendental presuppositions. According to Marion Heinz and Heinrich Clairmont, 
Herder argues that it is “for the soul to recognize, by identifying its own image in the 
                                                 
24
 Marion Heinz and Heinrich Clairmont, “Herder’s Epistemology,” in A Companion to the Works 
of Johann Gottfried Herder (Hans Adler, ed.; Wulf Koepke, tr. & ed.; Rochester, NY: Camden House, 
2009, pp. 43-64), 60. 
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sensuous, that the sensuous is an image of God just like itself.”25 Herder’s approach at the 
time was universal in scope and also capable of grounding a theology through which 
traditional Christian vocabularies could be reclaimed and reinterpreted. This was, after 
all, precisely Spinoza’s project: not the destruction of religious practices but their 
application in promoting tolerance, goodwill, mutual help, and human knowledge in 
general. It is only as an effect of this single purpose or by a kind of default that Spinoza 
began a tradition of translating all known theologies and mythologies into a critical 
“cosmocentrism” or comparative cosmo-anthropology.26  
Before many of the projects growing out of Spinoza’s new theology were all but 
derailed in the mid-nineteenth century, another luminary of the German Enlightenment 
would address the problems Spinoza raised for confessional Christians and claim that, as 
a historic force, Christianity had already proved compatible with all the essentials of 
Spinoza’s cosmocentrism. Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher (1768-1834) was 
interested primarily in sociability, the nature and social force of religion, hermeneutics, 
and theology.
 27
 Studying Spinoza’s denial of free will, Schleiermacher called the chain 
                                                 
25
 Heinz & Clairmont, “Herder’s Epistemology,” 51. 
26
 Andre Santos Campos, Spinoza’s Revolutions in Natural Law (Basingstoke & New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 41-42. In a more negative characterization of this ongoing hermeneutical 
project, Warren Montag, Bodies, Masses, Power: Spinoza and His Contemporaries (London & New York: 
Verso, 1999), 3-4 asserts: “Spinoza sought not to convince his readers to abandon theology (which is not 
merely a set of disembodied ideas that might be accepted or rejected at will, but rather ideas immanent in a 
set of corporeal practices that are in certain ways inescapable), but instead to show them how to think 
rationally within it, in its terms, in a way that not only accepts the premises of any theology, but which even 
offers itself as theology’s strongest defence, thereby turning it against itself.”  
27
 On synthesizing the knowledge of science and of religion in the footsteps of Spinoza, a project 
Schleiermacher called higher realism, see Julia A. Lamm, The Living God: Schleiermacher’s Theological 
Appropriation of Spinoza (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press,1996). 
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of transitive causation the “All,” because an individual’s emplacement in the chain is 
dependent upon all other creatures in the infinite series. Furthermore, as an explanation of 
the immediate physical existence of an individual, he noted an incisive and direct 
dependence upon the divine immanent causation, the unity of which responds 
retroductively to consciousness when the question, “Whence?,” is asked of it and which 
Schleiermacher therefore called the “One.”28 For Schleriermacher, the feeling of 
creaturely dependence is absolute and this double or quasi-double dependence upon the 
One and All accounts for the actual phenomena of living consciousness. This feeling of 
absolute creaturely dependence obtained in self-consciousness is the very foundation of 
Schleiermacher’s version of Christian faith. Following Spinoza, Herder and 
Schleiermacher contributed to a naturalized Judeo-Christian theology on the one hand 
while demonstrating on the other that it could be used to empower, rather than diminish, 
a Christian worldview. 
With the rise of the Left Hegelians, Spinoza’s reputation as a secular philosopher 
displaced his reputation as a Judeo-Christian thinker. Hegel, Feuerbach, Nietzsche, and 
others appropriated Spinoza for their own agendas, and the study of labor, capital, and the 
mathematical sciences came to dominate western intellectual history after Marx.
29
 When 
Spinoza’s words were later scrutinized with the methods of twentieth-century analytical 
                                                 
28
 The Hen kai Pan (One and All) that gained currency in the German Enlightenment is a formula 
expressing nonduality that can be traced back to Heracleitus, Fragment 59: “Couples are wholes and not 
wholes, what agrees disagrees, the concordant is discordant. From all things one and from one all things.” 
Lessing made use of this phrase and it is discussed in the pantheism controversy. 
29
 Pierre Macherey, Hegel or Spinoza (Susan M. Ruddick, tr.; Minneapolis & London: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2011 [1979]). 
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philosophy, the conclusions of the Ethics were exasperatingly found wanting.
30
 But there 
have been efforts, mostly under the radar screen of the more popular scholarship, to 
continue studying Spinoza as a religious thinker. The next chapter explores the late 
modern and contemporary tension between Spinoza’s reception as a secular thinker and 
his reception as a religious thinker. As will be shown, the latter contributes to 
understanding his theory of friendship. 
 
 
 
                                                 
30
 Christopher Norris, “Spinoza and the Conflict of Interpretations,” in Spinoza Now (Dimitris 
Vardoulakis, ed.). Minneapolis & London: University of Minnesota Press, 2011, pp. 3-37); and Christopher 
Norris, Spinoza and the Origins of Modern Critical Theory (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991). 
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CHAPTER 2 
A CRISIS OF RELIGIOUS IDEAS AND SECULAR SENSIBILITIES 
In “The Religious Element in Spinoza’s Philosophy” (1943), Walter Eckstein 
(1891-1975) explores the debate concerning Spinoza’s religious views. Eckstein 
addresses speculative theories and characterizations of Spinoza’s atheism and, from the 
opposing camp, of his saintly religiosity. Eckstein understands that the Ethics taken out 
of historical context or read through the lens of more recent philosophy will lose its 
religious tone and significance.
31
 Eckstein digs into the historic context in which Spinoza 
wrote and examines important passages from the full body of Spinoza’s works. Eckstein 
emplaces Spinoza in the “liberal protestant sects of his time” and identifies language 
common to the writings of Spinoza and his fellow Collegiants.
32
   
Spinoza advocated a religious attitude of love for others based upon principles of 
natural law over and against the half-hearted response to fear and superstition that he 
believed characterized traditional Jewish and Christian theology. Eckstein notes how, on 
the one hand, Spinoza vehemently denies God’s anthropomorphism and any attendant 
anthropocentric interests, while on the other hand identifying the minds of human beings 
as the very medium through which the divine knows and loves itself. In Eckstein’s 
account, the key to understanding this seeming paradox, and the one upon which Spinoza 
builds his religious views and ethical values, is the notion of a fixed and immutable order 
of nature (fixus et immutabilis ordo naturae). Although denying human justice to the 
                                                 
31
 Walter Eckstein, “The Religious Element in Spinoza’s Philosophy” (The Journal of Religion, 
Vol. 23, No. 3, 1943, pp. 153-163), 157 n 14. 
32
 Eckstein, “The Religious Element in Spinoza’s Philosophy,” 156-157. 
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divine, at the same time “Spinoza is most anxious to refute any negative evaluation of 
nature,” a point that Eckstein believes is underemphasized in the literature.33 “The 
science of the Renaissance had discovered the infinity and homogeneity of the universe 
… Spinoza’s aim was not to reconcile religion to science but rather to draw the 
metaphysical and ethical conclusions from the scientific premises.”34 Eckstein argues 
that, for Spinoza, salvation consists of understanding and submitting to the eternal, 
rational, and interconnected order of which human beings are a small part. Although 
Spinoza denies that reality has no inherent purpose of its own, Eckstein argues that, for 
Spinoza, the homogeneity of the eternal world order (aeternus ordo totius naturae) 
provides humanity with necessary and sufficient grounds for ethical values and even a 
religious orientation. 
 Perplexities resulting from any study of Spinoza’s writings are understandable. 
The form and the content of the Ethics are quite unlike those of any other celebrated 
philosophical or theological text. Spinoza has been read as a cold rationalist, as a Jewish-
secular-humanist, as an “Enlightenment” thinker, as a materialist, and as a scientist. In 
one way or another, many scholars have thus distorted what Spinoza actually said by 
forcing his words to have some historical agenda that Spinoza himself never intended.  
Furthermore, far fewer scholars have treated Spinoza as a Christian or even as a Judeo-
Christian writer, despite his actual discourses and behavior. 
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Albert Einstein (1879-1955), a self-described disciple of Spinoza who even 
pilgrimaged  to Spinoza’s home in Rijnsburg, cavalierly claimed that only “serious 
scientific workers” such as himself are qualified to understand the new theology of 
Spinoza.
35
 Alan Donagan (1925-1991), espousing a more traditional post-Enlightenment 
Jewish perspective, dubiously claims that Spinoza not only clung to his Jewish identity, 
“but wished to communicate it to non-Jews.”36  Supporting this claim, Donagan states 
that “The Tractatus Theologico-Politicus and certain of Spinoza’s letters show that he 
was a Jew by birth and education, but had ceased to be a member of the Jewish 
community without subscribing, even outwardly, to any branch of Christianity … He 
was, perhaps, the first European to avow the secularization of intellectual life as an ideal, 
and to live it.”37 But textual research by Steven Frankel and Richard Popkin and 
biolgraphical research by Steven Nadler and others provide ground for contesting 
Donagan’s claim regarding Spinoza’s involvement with Christianity and avowed 
secularism. The proof text Donagan cites to support Spinoza’s Jewishness is also taken 
out of context, and a careful reading of the original source (Letter 76) shows that where 
Donagan sees lauding, Spinoza is actually scorning the sentiments of Judah the Faithful 
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(Don Lope de Vera y Alarcon), a converso (or New Christian) who, after reverting back 
to Judaism, was burned at the stake in 1644.
38
   
The importance of language in the Ethics stems from Spinoza’s treatment of the 
Cartesian doctrine of clear and adequate ideas (e.g. of God and singular things) and 
inadequate or confused ideas (often produced by misperception, memory, and 
imagination). Different approaches to this doctrine have resulted in different theories in 
the field. Norris approaches Spinoza as a progenitor of critical theory and theorizes error 
in his reading of the Ethics and its reception history. Norris shows how Kant, literary 
theorists such as Jacques Derrida and Paul de Man, and Althusserian Marxists all 
inherited and grappled with the problem of how to objectively warrant truth (or warrant 
objective truth) that Spinoza investigates in the Ethics. In the trajectory of this reception 
history, Norris finds that “there is no dispensing with enlightened critique – with the 
effort to demystify received concepts and categories – since it is only by way of such a 
vigilant procedure that thought can detect the hidden workings of prejudice.”39 The 
efforts of Norris and those he studies in Spinoza & the Origins of Modern Critical Theory 
demonstrate that, for human beings, the determination of truth per se involves an 
irreducible and perpetually inconclusive political element. Put another way: after Spinoza 
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philosophy became a political activity and its search for irrefutable truths was replaced 
(pace Althusser) by critical assessment of the effects rendered by its own production.
40
  
In Vol. 1 of Spinoza and Other Heretics, Yirmiyahu Yovel approaches language 
in Spinoza by critically characterizing the Dutch theologian as “The Marrano of Reason.” 
Yovel amasses a wealth of evidence showing how, in response to the persecution in 
Spain and Portugal that included forced conversion to Christianity and the Inquisition, 
Spinoza’s Jewish ancestors developed a survival technique involving dual identities and 
dual language. With their public “masks,” these Sephardim fit into the dominant 
Christian culture as best they could while, in private, preserving their own customs, 
traditions, and, in some cases, religious practices. This resulted in multi-level 
communications in which a seemingly straightforward message articulated in the 
language of the dominant culture also conveyed a sub-text understood by other minority 
Marrano hearers.  
From this critical historical context, Yovel theorizes that Spinoza’s texts are also 
written in this kind of dual language. Although Yovel’s discussion of the dual language 
used by the Sephardim repays reading, there are two important factors missing in his 
discussion of Spinoza’s texts. By focusing almost exclusively on Renaissance Spanish 
literature and the Sephardim experience from Spain to Portugal and the Dutch Republic, 
Yovel elides other important linguistic influences on Spinoza, including the standard four 
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varieties of traditional rabbinic commentaries (viz.: simple, allegorical, comparative, and 
esoteric) as well as Aristotelian and scholastic pros hen equivocation.
41
 This deficiency 
misleads Yovel to conclude that Spinoza uses philosophical language, like the Marrano 
experience in general, as “a play of masks,” reserving a core secular philosophical 
program for those mature enough to handle it while presenting an imaginary version of 
the same dressed up in religious language.
42
 
Yovel represents what had been, until only the last several decades, the majority 
reading of Spinoza’s intentions and use of language. Operating from the premise that 
Spinoza was “a loner” who “did not merely oppose” all traditions, who “was not just a 
reformer of revealed religions but its adamant enemy”, Yovel concludes that Spinoza’s 
“hidden esoteric truth, the one that leads to true salvation, is not Judaism in opposition to 
Christianity, but the immanent religion of reason in opposition to all historical 
religions.”43 “All historical religions” can only be taken in a very qualified sense for 
Yovel’s assertion to warrant any merit, and must exclude, at minimum: the early Hebrew 
state, the early Christian church, and some of the underground Christian sects developing 
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during Spinoza’s time. But Yovel’s motivations are most apparent at the end of Spinoza 
and Other Heretics where he celebrates the acceptance of nonreligious Jewishness. 
“[T]he same kind of heresies that made Spinoza submit to a ban and be decried a 
renegade did not prevent Freud from being accepted and recognized as a [Jewish] 
brother.”44 Spinoza’s most significant legacy, in Yovel’s estimation, is the secularizing 
effects of his supposedly heretical views. 
In another account of Spinoza as an enemy of religion, Jonathan Israel celebrates 
the Radical Enlightenment growing out of the mid-seventeenth century. Israel traces the 
partial emancipation of women and other classes as well as the loss of magic and 
superstition from the educated populace to the early period of this movement (1650-
1750). By the time Voltaire arrives on the scene in the mid-eighteenth century, Israel 
contends, a “decisive shift towards rationalization and secularization at every level” of 
society had already taken place all across Europe.
45
 Israel bolsters his argument with a 
vast array of documented influences that went into and came out of the religion of reason 
promulgated by Spinoza and his friends. Published in 2001, Israel’s Radical 
Enlightenment already enjoys a considerable reception in the field of Spinoza 
scholarship.  
Although acknowledging Israel’s important contribution, Christopher Norris 
claims that Radical Enlightenment offers only “a fairly routine treatment of Spinoza’s 
philosophical ideas and a relative lack of concern with their specific rather than general 
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bearing on that ferment of radical ideas that his book brings so vividly to life.”46 Norris 
places Israel in a tradition of commentary that focuses on Spinoza’s “underground 
reputation” as an “atheist, materialist, and politically subversive” thinker.47 In his textual 
analyses, Israel does focus narrowly on the secularizing effects found in Spinoza’s 
reception history, drawing primarily upon the reactions to Spinoza made by others in the 
early Radical Enlightenment. For example, after a detailed account of the publication of 
Spinoza’s Opera Posthuma, wherein the Ethics was promulgated to the scholarly 
community in Latin and to the larger population in Dutch, Israel treats of significant 
impressions made by Catholic and Protestant churchmen. This includes, interestingly, 
what may be reasonably considered the first known book review of the published Ethics, 
made by one Johannes van Neercassel (d. 1686), the Vicar Apostolic of the Dutch 
Catholic Church. “On perusing the volume, he [Neercassel] was baffled to find, contrary 
to expectation, that Spinoza does not in fact propound atheism as normally understood 
‘but avowedly teaches Deism’.”48 Israel also cites a 1705 tract penned by the Dutch 
Reformed preacher, Johannes Aalstius (1660-1712). In his text, Aalstius claims that the 
“essential ideas” of Spinoza’s Ethics are easy for all to understand, and lists several of 
those notions he perceives as threatening established religious institutions and practices.
49
 
An early reading of Spinoza’s Ethics, Aalstius’ claims now range from spot on to still 
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hotly contested to no longer generally corroborated in the field. Sticking closely to a 
narrative of the effects of Radical Enlightenment thought, Israel allows the reactionary 
commentary of many early modern critics to effectively read secularism back into 
Spinoza’s texts. 
An older irenic reading of Spinoza’s place in the landscape of early modern 
theology is found in Rufus M. Jones’ Spiritual Reformers in the 16th & 17th Centuries. 
Jones follows a trend he calls “spiritual Religion” in early Reformation history that 
attempted to combine mysticism, rationalism or humanism, and Reformation faith into a 
whole. “It was an impressive attempt, whether completely successful or not, to widen the 
sphere and scope of religion, to carry it into the whole of life, to ground it in the very 
nature of the human spirit, and to demonstrate that to be a man, possessed of full life and 
complete health, is to be religious, to be spiritual.”50 Jones contextualizes Spinoza’s 
involvement with the Dutch Collegiants, Mennonites, Cartesians, and the English 
Quakers as part of a larger Christian trend focusing on inner spiritual experience and love 
of neighbor. 
As a critical reading of the philosophical and theological content of the Ethics, 
Harry A. Wolfson’s (1887-1974) The Philosophy of Spinoza: Unfolding the Latent 
Processes of His Reasoning (1934) remains an important resource in the field. Wolfson’s 
two-volume text traces the origins and developments of Spinoza’s ideas from classical 
Greek, Hebrew, medieval scholastic, and early modern sources. Wolfson shows how 
Spinoza often took the ideas of his predecessors to their logical conclusions in the more 
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scandalous doctrines of the Ethics such as the denial of free will. It is easy to see, from 
Wolfson’s account, how the young Spinoza engaged the authors of his Jewish heritage 
and wrestled with their ideas about God, truth, mind, body, eternity, necessity, causation, 
and the other major topics found in the Ethics.  
For Spinoza, Divine Law was precisely natural law. Wolfson identifies a 
“principle of the unity of nature” in the Ethics “which in its double aspect meant the 
homogeneity of the material world of which it is constituted and the uniformity of the 
laws by which it is dominated.”51 In Wolfson’s account, Spinoza commits four “daring” 
philosophical acts warranting the principle of the uniformity of nature: the argument that 
God has an attribute of extension; a denial of design and purpose in God; an 
understanding of a “complete inseparability” between body and soul; and a total denial of 
free will in human decisions. Where predecessors felt troubled by their inability to 
account for a break in the homogeneity of natural law that would warrant human 
autonomy, Spinoza found an opportunity for a new way of thinking. Wolfson documents 
the trends in medieval philosophy that undoubtedly influenced these movements in 
Spinoza’s theology. 
Aaron Garrett builds upon the principle of the unity of nature identified by 
Wolfson. In Meaning in Spinoza’s Method, Garrett argues that a close reading of the 
Ethics can be therapeutic, bringing about a kind of defragmentation or feeling of 
wholeness in the reader. Garrett notes that the key to Spinoza’s method is the doctrine of 
                                                 
51
 Harry A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza: Unfolding the Latent Processes of His 
Reasoning (2 vols., Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1934), Vol. 2, 331 ff. For a study of the 
legal and ontological implications of this theme in relation primarily to Spinoza’s Theological-Political 
Treatise and unfinished Political Treatise; see Santos Campos, Spinoza’s Revolutions in Natural Law. 
  24 
the individual, or “singular thing” (res singularis). Garrett states that Definition 7 in Part 
II of the Ethics, Spinoza’s definition of a singular thing, is “likely derived” from Thomas 
Hobbes’ (1588-1679) Leviathan, a book prominent in the mind of Spinoza and his 
contemporaries.
52
 The illustrated title page of Leviathan shows the figure of a sovereign 
prince wielding military and ecclesiastical power and whose body is composed of his 
subjects. “Hobbes maintains a difference between artificial and natural beings (for 
example me and Leviathan) although he views them both as singular things. An 
important and interesting fact about Spinoza is that he makes no such distinction. For 
Spinoza, the Leviathan and I are equally singular things if we are both the causes of one 
effect.”53 Spinoza’s famous Letter 32 describes a worm (“the seventeenth-century term 
for a simple organism”) moving through a bloodstream, observing its world of chyle, 
lymph, and other blood particles much as we observe all the things moving about us in 
our world.
54
 But, like the worm, we are unable to know the bigger whole to which we 
belong, at least as it is in itself, that is, as an individual thing. In Spinoza’s account, ours 
is a body belonging to larger and larger systems of bodies and, in turn, composed of 
smaller and smaller bodies. Much in the Ethics relates to this notion of res singularis and 
its implications. Garrett further comments on the analogy, noting that “at the end of 
Letter XXXII Spinoza remarks: ‘I conceive that with regard to substance each part has a 
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closer union with its whole.’ Here Spinoza is clearly using whole in a positive sense, as 
well as part.”55 No matter how absolutely infinite God may be, he shares one important 
characteristic with all of his creatures: that of being an individual thing. “There is 
something about the relation of substance to mode, as opposed to that of worm to blood, 
which, although apparently infinitely more inaccessible, abstract, and remote, is actually 
more proximate and draws out a different sense of part.”56 A human or other being’s 
relationship with God is far more intimate than any other relationship between any other 
whole and its parts.  
This special relationship is an important feature of Spinoza’s theology. Spinoza,57 
Leibniz,
58
 Boyle,
59
 and Conway
60
 all share a commitment to the view of physical reality 
as comprised of “‘little bodies’ incorporated into larger wholes,”61 interacting on scales 
that decrease microscopically and increase macroscopically in both directions 
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simultaneously to infinity.
62
 According to Justin E. H. Smith, “insofar as early modern 
natural philosophers sought to mark out the boundaries of mechanical physics, willy-nilly 
they came right up to its boundary with biology … [Some of] these philosphers felt 
compelled … to explain why the particles and billiard balls themselves have something 
of the animal in them, and thus must be explained in biological terms.”63 For these 
seventeenth century philosophers, this framework was never separate from the question, 
what is (are) the most basic animating force(s) of all of these interactive processes 
comprising the world, and how did it (they) operate? Addressing this question constituted 
the project of physico-theology.
64
 Although the competing vitalist and Spinozist solutions 
to the problem, along with the question itself, were eventually displaced by the 
mechanics of Newtonian astrophysics and other philosophical concerns, it was within this 
context of physico-theology that the late seventeenth and eighteenth century fight for the 
constitution and direction of Judeo-Christian thought took place.
65
 Buried in the prolix of 
these philosophers are shades of signification in their arguments and terms and subtle 
differences of opinion regarding theodicy and similar matters perhaps tedious by today’s 
standards but signifying an extreme urgency at the time. Meanwhile, nineteenth and 
twentieth century developments in the hard sciences emerged making Newton’s 
mechanistic science and any epistemologies based on them, in turn, obsolete. As a 
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consequence, some of the questions investigated by early modern natural philosophers 
are being reexamined anew as the reductivistic or positivistic philosophies of science in 
the English-speaking world have had to loosen their stranglehold on genuine 
cosmological research and traditional (or so-called alternative) ontologies.
66
 
In The Radical Spinoza, Paul Wienpahl (1916-1980) takes full account of 
Spinoza’s treatment of the divine-human relationship in the context of mystical union or 
awakening. Borrowing a phrase from Buddhism for purposes of analysis, Wienpahl 
explains the relationship in Spinoza’s metaphysics between mind and body and between 
substance and modes as non-dual. “All of Spinoza’s thinking centers about the notion of 
unity and his life was one of atonement or at-one-ment.”67 There are whole traditions of 
non-dual wisdom in Asia and there are individual mystics in the western monotheistic 
traditions who have experienced non-duality or union with the divine.
68
 According to 
Wienpahl, Spinoza dares to provide a rational method for attaining such unitive 
knowledge. Although Wienpahl classifies Spinoza as a mystic who has discovered “a 
way of knowing that stems from but is beyond the rational,” he emphasizes that ecstasy 
was not Spinoza’s priority, but rather living an ethical life.69 And, since Spinoza draws 
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his materials from monotheistic theology, largely of the Jewish variety, Wienpahl also 
submits that Spinoza’s God is “the God of his fathers.”70  
If the Ethics is a demanding text, Wienpahl’s is likewise a demanding 
commentary. Close study of the Ethics, according to Wienpahl, should lead the reader to 
experience singular things in the most natural and straightforward way possible. Based on 
this method, Spinoza’s new theology is a way of knowing, which in Hebrew, English, and 
other languages, comes from the same root as the word, loving.
71
 
Wienpahl notes that what often hinders unitive knowledge, according to Spinoza, 
is memory and imagination. This includes not only religious images such as 
anthropomorphic deities but also imaginary linguistic entities that Wienpahl traces back 
to Aristotle. “The superstition that often surrounds religion and the fact that this [unitive] 
way of knowing is affective as well as cognitive have tended to render it obscure as a 
way of knowing. Sp[inoza]’s rational account of it reduces this obscurity… Feeling 
oneness is also thinking it.”72 Intimately bound to Aristotle’s notions of substances and 
the attributes or properties that adhere to them, Wienpahl claims that the grammatical 
subject-predicate form has come to dominate western language and thought. The result, 
in this account, has been a kind of hoodwinking of speakers into believing that they are 
talking about a sticky thing-ness (substances) where in actuality there is only a collection 
of absolutely unique activities (modes or measures of a single infinite substance, 
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according to Spinoza). In Wienpahl’s study of Spinoza, what prevents unitive knowledge 
are all the false identities inextricably bound to the linguistic data produced and 
consumed by the imagination, even (or especially) the religious imagination.
73
  
Here we find Spinoza’s point of departure from traditional mind-body duality. 
“So-called ‘mind’ and ‘body’ are one and the same thing looked at in different ways. A 
human being is not two things, but one with different attributes.”74 And that one thing 
that is a finite human being is not self-established or substantial.
75
 Because of language, 
in Wienpahl’s reading of the Ethics, we may experience individual things as separable 
mental or physical entities (what Spinoza calls beings of imagination), but unitive 
knowledge can only begin and be sustained in the immediate nominal experience of 
individual things themselves.
76
 Human Freedom, Chapter 9 of The Radical Spinoza, is 
Wienpahl’s reading of Part V of the Ethics. Here, Wienpahl shows how Spinoza develops 
his doctrines of immortality and blessedness from the unitive knowledge of individual 
things.  
If clarity of knowledge or perception “that comes with a true idea of unity, that is, 
with union” is the subject of the Ethics, as Wienpahl contends, then what does this have 
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to do with monotheism?
77
 If traditional Judeo-Christian monotheism is understood, as 
indeed it was by the vast majority of Spinoza’s contemporaries, as having to do primarily 
with God’s revelation to Moses, the death and resurrection of Christ, and the imagery of 
John’s Revelation, then the short answer is: nothing. But if monotheism is understood as 
a doctrine asserting the existence of a single divine being, then Spinoza’s Ethics cannot 
be so easily ignored, as the more theologically-minded of Spinoza’s contemporaries well 
knew. 
At the beginning and throughout the Theological-Political Treatise, Spinoza 
dismisses literal readings of such Biblical imagery as superstition that is dangerously 
incompatible with the scientific worldview and political pressures prevalent at the time. 
Yet, as he also argues in the same text, “philosophy rests on the basis of universally valid 
axioms, and must be constructed by studying Nature alone, whereas faith is based on 
history and language, and must be derived only from Scripture and revelation.”78 Since 
the exclusive object of faith, in his account, is piety and obedience to Divine Law, 
Spinoza actually insists that a familiarity with the revelatory imagery of the Bible is 
necessary to the cultivation of personal and national morality.  
As Wienpahl summarizes: In the Theological-Political Treatise “we see that this 
[the Ethics, Part 5, Proposition 41] was the teaching of the Old Testament, though it came 
in the form of commands. In the New [Testament] the teaching was not altered. It was 
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simply given a new basis in Love…All the talk of God [in the Ethics], then, is to help us 
in understanding this other [unitive] way of knowing.”79 Spinoza heartily endorses the 
images and stories of the Bible insofar as they support the kind of justice and charity 
cried out for by the prophets and the loving way of life championed by Christ.
80
 In 
(especially) Parts 4 and 5 of the Ethics, Spinoza “demonstrates” these same values more 
geometrico. 
In an appendix to The Radical Spinoza, Wienpahl provides his own close 
translation of the definitions, axioms, postulates, and propositions of the Ethics. His 
translation and their notes and the linguistic analyses and commentaries in his text 
emphasize Spinoza’s use of verbs in his philosophical language, a Latin informed by 
Hebrew. For example, Wienpahl translates Proposition 8 in Part I of the Ethics as: “Every 
substance necessarily is infinitely,” rather than, by way of comparison, Shirley’s more 
popular translation, “Every substance is necessarily infinite.” To read Spinoza correctly, 
Wienpahl insists, nouns (especially the philosophical terms) in the Ethics must be read as 
adjectives, and finite individual things (“affections of a substance,” or “modes”) read as 
modifications of verbs. Wherever “adjectives are used to modify ‘God,’ ‘Being,’ or 
‘Nature,’ they should be changed to adverbs.”81 Most importantly, the word, “is,” rather 
than functioning as a copula connecting predicates to subjects in the definitions, 
propositions, and proofs, should in every proposition be read as an active verb in accord 
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with Spinoza’s special philosophical use of the word, Being.82 “Linguistically speaking, 
all [that is experienced in the resultant unitive knowing] becomes adjectival or 
adverbial.”83 Even for Spinoza, for whom language was a main methodological issue, 
exercising the beings of imagination from any linguistic expression of an individual 
thing, including God, is difficult in ordinary experience and virtually impossible for the 
masses because of the very nature of identity embedded in western languages.
84
 “The 
Aristotelian view” and concomitant grammatical structures posit “that reality is the static 
and unchanging beneath the changing appearances.”85 Spinoza’s philosophical weapons 
for overcoming this duality are linguistic, and approaching the Ethics thusly armed, 
Wienpahl advises, will help a reader deconstruct old habits of thinking and come to a 
clearer and more distinct way of apprehending individual things, including God.  
Wienpahl argues that the result of this exercise is properly a religious one, in 
Spinoza’s sense of the term religion, i.e.: living according to an intuitive knowledge of 
Divine Law or God’s Idea. “The dictates of reason are familiar. They are the moral 
precepts taught in the great religions. In the early Hebrew and the Christian religions their 
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justification lay in faith and revelation … In the ETHIC their justification lies in 
understanding or knowing them intuitively. This … consists in having clear and distinct, 
or true ideas of them; which also means living them. True ideas are Affections or ways of 
behaving.”86 As Wienpahl makes evident, to the extent that the philosophical terms found 
in the Ethics may entail a theory of monotheism, they are properly understood as 
involving a constant and revolutionary movement away from the beings of imagination 
Spinoza attributed to words and other representations and towards a living, unitive 
knowledge of that which such imaginary identities represent. In Wienpahls account, this 
rule applies to the Ethics itself, as well as to Scripture. 
As Wienpahl demonstrates, Spinoza’s scientific intuition (scientia intuitiva) is a 
form of unitive or mystical religious experience. And, as Steven Frankel argues, 
Spinoza’s new theology is based upon the principles of tolerance and democracy drawn 
out of Jesus’ “philosophy” in the Theological-Political Treatise.87 The notion that 
Spinoza eviscerates these religious principles and Judeo-Christian values in some esoteric 
sub-text anywhere in his work is, at best, contentious. Incredibly, however, Harry 
Wolfson does contend that the “true nature” of Spinoza’s work was better understood by 
others than by Spinoza himself, and that others were able to see through Spinoza’s piety 
to the dead god of his new theology.
88
 In a likewise cynical but somewhat more nuanced 
passage, Yovel discusses “the special position of the subject which Hegel was right to 
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stress against Spinoza,” and asks: “How can the (Spinozistic) principle of immanence be 
‘subjectivized’ without losing its strict natural character and without falling back upon 
teleology and disguised theology?”89 On the first point, regarding God’s “natural 
character,”  it is far from certain that the pure affirmation Spinoza posits as substance can 
be read anywhere as a pure objectivity.
90
 If anything, being indeterminately, it is pre-
conscious (pre-subject/pre-object), pre-physical, etc. On the second point, it seems 
equally uncertain that Spinoza recommends avoiding “teleology” and “theology” at all. 
Recognizing the nominal, hence immanent, character of telos is, arguably, Spinoza’s only 
recommendation.
91
  
Against the grain of much traditional Spinoza scholarship, summarized here in the 
sentiments of Wolfson and Yovel, the assumption that Spinoza’s Ethics is an attempt to 
displace traditional religion altogether is problematized in this study. Despite its 
ponderous intellectual magnitude and eager reception by despisers of Jewish and 
Christian religiosity, Spinoza intended the Ethics as a bulwark for what he understood as 
the lifeblood of all true religiosity: seeking unitive knowledge of the divine and living 
according to simple and sure principles such as friendship. 
                                                 
89
 Yovel, Spinoza and Other Heretics, Vol. 2, 77.  
90
 E1d6expl.: “that however, which is absolutely infinitely, whatever expresses being, & involves 
no negation pertains to its being” (Wienpahl, The Radical Spinoza, 180). 
91
 See Propositions 16, 18, 20, 29, & 33 in Part 1 of the Ethics. 
  35 
CHAPTER 3 
THE SPIRIT OF FRIENDSHIP IN SPINOZA’S LIFE 
He [Jesus] answered, ‘ “Love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your 
soul, with all your mind.” That is the greatest commandment. It comes first. The 
second is like it: “Love your neighbour as yourself.” Everything in the Law and 
the prophets hangs on these two commandments.’ 
— Matthew 22:37-40 (NEB)92 
The master of the Beth Jacob synagogue where Spinoza attended school was 
Rabbi Saul Morteira.
93
 Current sources indicate that Morteira was a stern Ashkenazic 
from Germany, and he was well aware of contemporary intellectual currents such as 
Christianized kabbalah that were mixing and merging in new and unpredictable ways all 
over Europe. Morteira was determined to keep such distortions of Orthodox Judaism out 
of his halakhic domain, but he could not prevent his students from imagining what all the 
commotion was about outside of the domain.  
 In 1649, at age seventeen, when their older brother, Isaac, died, “Bento” and 
surviving brother, Gabriel, were called upon to help their father, Michael, run a troubled 
family mercantile in the Amsterdam Burse. The burse was a stock exchange in the 
original sense: a port, warehouses, and marketplace. The family firm was called “Bento y 
Gabriel de Spinoza.”94 It was here that Spinoza began forging friendships with minorities 
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and other outcasts of the larger community of Amsterdam: Spanish immigrant Sephardic 
Jews like himself and their ethnic converso relations, and members of Christian sects 
such as the Collegiants, Mennonites, and Quakers.
95
  
 An importer of “fancy vegetables”, raisins, sugar, and other goods, Spinoza paid 
attention to all of the details not only of his business transactions, but also of the quality 
of everything with which, and the behavior of everyone with whom, he interacted.
96
 
Whatever their beliefs or professed moral bearings, Spinoza noted that people really only 
act through self-interest, and that the seeking of one’s own advantage is trebled in 
numbers, as the English and Moorish pirates who brought the Spinoza family business to 
ruin demonstrated. But far from bewailing selfishness, Spinoza made it the starting point 
of his ethics, metaphysics, theology, and political science. Thomas Hobbes famously 
claimed that the natural state of humanity is a war of all against all and that people 
artificially (i.e., against their naturally bellicose reasoning) band together to construct a 
stable commonwealth protected by a powerful sovereign to whom they submit much of 
their natural rights, that is, their right to struggle against one another. In contrast, Spinoza 
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claimed that because human beings find friendships rationally advantageous to their 
survival and thus suited to their best interest, they organically form social bonds that 
remain very much within the context of the natural order of things.
97
 For Hobbes, persons 
move away from nature and diminish their power when entering into a social contract.
98
 
For Spinoza, persons move closer to divine perfection and increase their power to the 
extent that they conform to the sovereignty of the state in which they live.
99
 
 Ending when Spinoza was sixteen years old, the notoriously cruel Thirty Years 
War (1618-1648) had just taken eight million lives in Europe, a ratio of deaths to total 
population exceeding that in the twentieth century caused by both world wars.
100
 The 
Thirty Year War began as a religious conflict between Protestants and Catholics and 
ended as a political conflict between fiefdoms vying for power. Through his observations 
of wars, persecutions, political events, and other human behavior, Spinoza came to regard 
jealousy (zelotypia) as anathema to friendship, a barrier to the knowledge of God, and the 
very source of human cruelty. Spinoza observed how, at various individual and 
institutional levels, jealousy involved self-pity, disenchantment, self-abuse, rigidity from 
the pulpit and in the classroom, and finally lashing out at others, persecution, and 
censorship.  
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There was no freedom of the press in early modern Europe, and anyone who 
wanted to print anything in Amsterdam had to get permission from the consistory of the 
Reformed Church or else print anonymously underground and hope that they did not get 
caught. An early anonymous tract that Spinoza had written, The Short Tratise on God, 
Man, and His Well-Being (c. 1662), had been circulating around Holland and not only 
influenced the worldview of his generation, but it also played a role in the demise of his 
friends, the brothers Adriaan and Johannes (Jan) Koerbagh.
101
 Influenced by Spinoza, 
Adriaan had illegally published two texts of his own, A Garden of All Kinds of Loveliness 
Without Sorrow (1668) and A Light Shining in Dark Places (1669). Not being able to find 
Adriaan, the Dutch authorities first arrested his brother Jan. With a hefty bounty, Adriaan 
was eventually located and died in Rasphuis Prison within a year. Jan was released, but 
died three years later. Not paranoid, but certainly wishing to avoid a similar fate, 
Spinoza’s signet ring motto was CAUTE (Caution!), and he worked closely with his 
translators, Pieter Balling and Jarig Jellesz, and with his publisher, Jan Rieuwertsz, to 
stop translating or printing a work if he felt it would get him arrested.
102
 Spinoza 
cultivated a close-knit, even political, community of people who shared his aims and 
ideas, all centered around tolerance, kindness to others, and free speech.  
 The love felt between these friends is best documented in a letter Spinoza wrote to 
Pieter Balling on July 20,1664. Author of The Light Upon the Candlestick, Balling was a 
Mennonite who worked very closely with Spinoza on theological projects. Balling traded 
                                                 
101
 Stewart, The Courtier and the Heretic, 98-99. 
102
 Michael Morgan’s Introduction to the Theological-Political Treatise in Spinoza, Complete 
Works, 384. 
  39 
with Spanish companies at the burse, and may have conversed with Spinoza in 
Spanish.
103
 Balling’s Latin to Dutch translation of Spinoza’s Principles of Cartesian 
Philosophy
104
 was published by Rieuwertsz in 1664. In June of that same year, Balling’s 
son was taken by the plague. In the only surviving letter of their correspondence, Spinoza 
writes to Balling: 
Dear friend, 
Your last letter, written, if I am not mistaken, on the 26th of last month, has 
reached me safely. It caused me no little sorrow and anxiety, though that has 
much diminished when I reflect on the good sense and strength of character which 
enable you to scorn the adversities of fortune, or what is thought of as such, at the 
very time when they are assailing you with their strongest weapons. Still, my 
anxiety increases day by day, and I therefore beg and beseech you not to regard it 
as burdensome to write me without stint. 
… 
[A] father so loves his son that he and his beloved son are, as it were, one and 
the same. And since … there must necessarily exist in Thought an idea of the 
affections of the essence of the son and what follows therefrom, and the father by 
reason of his union with his son is a part of the said son, the soul of the father 
must likewise participate in the ideal essence of his son, and in its affections and 
what follows therefrom…105  
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 The mixture of tender emotions and philosophical reflection in Spinoza’s letter to 
Balling is a précis of the rigor and sensitivity evident throughout Spinoza’s writings.106  
With the assistance of friends Spinoza was able to write tracts and letters to others 
in Holland and abroad with a certain measure of security and to thus participate in the 
European intellectual scene. Spinoza also enjoyed a thriving social life at home, and the 
modest spaces in which he resided frequently took on the atmosphere of an early modern 
salon. A French doctor and early biographer of Spinoza, Jean-Maximilian Lucas (1646-
1697), writes that Spinoza’s 
conversation had such an air of geniality and his comparisons were so just that he 
made everybody fall in unconsciously with his views. He was persuasive although 
he did not affect polished or elegant diction. He made himself so intelligible, and 
his discourse was so full of good sense, that none listened to him without deriving 
satisfaction. These fine talents attracted to him all reasonable people, and 
whatever time it may have been one always found him in an even and agreeable 
humor … He had a great and penetrating mind and every complacent disposition. 
He had a wit so well seasoned that the most gentle and the most severe found very 
peculiar charms in it.
107
 
Until Spinoza felt that a given interlocutor was growing hostile or until such a time that 
he and another were talking past each other (which he referred to as an inability to agree 
on first principles) Spinoza exercised a kindly patience unknown to many. Spinoza could 
get over his personal annoyances about a speaker or author and seize upon his 
interlocutor’s own ideas in such a way as to build up his own demonstrations for and 
                                                 
106
 Balling heard groaning from his son that he took as an omen prior to his son’s death. Spinoza 
addresses Balling’s concern in detail in the letter; see Nadler, Spinoza: A Life, 212-213. Balling also died in 
the plague. 
107
 Quoted in Nadler, Spinoza: A Life, 196. 
  41 
about his rational and friendship-based philosophy.
108
As a rule by which he lived, 
Spinoza was most eager to associate with anyone who could look past their own 
ideological prejudice and connect with him as a fellow seeker of the highest good.
109
  
 By the time his brother, Gabriel, could no longer live with him because of his 
excommunication, Spinoza may have already taken up residence in the home of his Latin 
teacher, Franciscus van den Enden (1602-1674).
110
 Evidence suggests that Spinoza met 
Van den Enden through his friends at the burse, and likely became a tutor himself in the 
Van den Enden household in the late 1650s. Spinoza “would have been exposed to an 
impressive range of important texts, ideas, and personalities” in Van den Enden’s 
school.
111
 Although Spinoza always self-identified as a monotheist, associating with Van 
den Enden did not help many early commentators receive the “new theology” as anything 
but atheism in disguise. Expelled from the Jesuit order at age nineteen, Van den Enden 
boldly campaigned to do away with all monarchy and institutional religion. A radical 
egalitarian, freethinker, expert linguist, Cartesian scholar, and proponent of educational 
reform, including the education of females, Van den Enden—still a firebrand at age 72—
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was hanged in France for plotting to replace the monarchy with his version of a 
democratic republican government.
112
  
  The Van den Enden home bustled with activity. Spinoza and his classmates 
learned Greek and Latin in part by composing, orating, and even performing classical 
plays for the Amsterdam public. Spinoza was undoubtedly familiar with Van den 
Enden’s neo-Latin play, Philedonius (1657), and may have even acted in it.113 Filled with 
religious themes and images, this play makes subtle use of language and is yet to be 
studied in connection with Spinoza’s theology. Nadler further notes that Van den Enden’s 
Free Political Propositions and Considerations of State (1665) contains the same Gospel 
passage (Matthew 22:37-40) Spinoza would make fundamental to his system five years 
later in the Theological-Political Treatise. “Van den Enden insisted that religious belief 
was a personal matter, not to be dictated by any organization or authority. True piety 
consisted only in the love of God and of one’s neighbors; that—in a phrase remarkably 
similar to how Spinoza puts it in the Theologico-Political Treatise—is ‘the whole sum of 
the Law and the Prophets.’”114 Spinoza’s religious views, and Van den Enden’s 
influences on them, are properly understood in the context of the horrors of war, 
corruption, inequality, and intolerance that both were attempting to address in their 
treatments of Scriptural meaning.  
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Spinoza ground lenses for reading glasses, telescopes, and microscopes for 
himself and his friends, and as a trade. Avid naturalists, he and his friends observed 
insects, stars, and everything else they could find through these lenses, noting their 
observations in the language of mathematics, new methods of which had to be invented 
on occasion in order to accommodate their discoveries. Spinoza found that no matter how 
far down he looked into small things, and no matter how far he looked into the night sky, 
whatever he encountered could be described in perfect detail as a commotion of 
mathematical ratios, pushing and pulling each other around, speeding up, slowing down, 
gathering together in equipoise, containing each other in different proportions, releasing 
each other and reforming.
115
 Spinoza saw all of this activity following a certain 
equilibrating order which he conceived of variously as God’s decree, the Divine Law, the 
Word of God,
116
 or “natura naturans.”117 As Nadler explains: 
There are, Spinoza insists, two sides of Nature. First, there is the active, 
productive aspect of the universe—God and his attributes, from which all else 
follows. This is what Spinoza…calls Natura naturans, “naturing Nature.” Strictly 
speaking, this is identical with God. The other aspect of the universe is that which 
is produced and sustained by the active aspect, Natura naturata, “natured 
Nature.”118 
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In human interactions, Spinoza realized, the divine equilibriating force took on the form 
of friendship, and all of the love, tenderness, pain, and pleasure that goes along with it. 
Even more, as Spinoza would expound in the Ethics, friendship was the most effective 
way to conceive of the equilibriating force not only in the political and social spheres, but 
also in the imperium of nature at large. Friendship is, as the Ethics concludes, God’s very 
own understanding of Love.  
The new theology Spinoza developed out of his understanding of Cartesian 
philosophy and his own empirical observations galvanized his Collegiant friends. 
Spinoza knew Hebrew, Dutch, Latin, Spanish, and the new language of analytical 
geometry that had just been invented by Descartes. He knew these five languages well 
enough to think in and between them, and also knew a smattering of Greek, French, 
Italian, and German. So whenever Spinoza was studying nature or talking with friends, he 
could speak and think about things in many different ways, and to a greater effect in the 
formation of friendships, than most people he encountered could even possibly imagine. 
Spinoza’s associates and rivals hungered to learn more about his methods.119  
But Spinoza’s deepest insights about the divine nature of friendship actually came 
from his study of the Bible. That the best interests of others are rationally linked with 
one’s own best interests is an understanding Spinoza gleaned from the words of the 
prophets and Christ. Not understanding this traditional Judeo-Christian element of 
Spinoza’s synthesis, the Ethics has proved something of a novelty, but mostly a dry and 
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obscure one in the extreme to many readers, and accounts for a long history of 
misinterpretation. 
What Spinoza hoped to accomplish through his work was to remove his passive 
or self-defeating emotions. Such negative emotions stifled those in the world around him. 
He observed that the dysfunction aroused by envy and jealousy especially prevented 
people from working and living together as friends.  
According to Spinoza, the binary directional nature of social bonding constitutes 
the actual truth value of every idea “insofar as it is an idea.”120 Our feelings towards other 
beings may fluctuate, but only in the binary direction of liking or disliking them, i.e., 
desiring to approach or escape their presence. A key insight of the Ethics is that this 
scheme can be seen analogically at work in the ratios of motion and rest comprising 
every kind of physical and mental process and individual thing.  
Spinoza studied Descartes’ writings with Van den Enden and attended lectures on 
Descartes at the University of Leiden. Spinoza attended Collegiant meetings “perhaps as 
early as late 1654.”121 Adam Boreel (1603-1665) was a founder of the Amsterdam 
Collegium (est. 1645), also known as the Borellists, a branch of Collegiants interested in 
integrating Cartesian philosophy into their version of spiritual Christianity.
122
 Lifelong 
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friends from the business community that Spinoza made during this time who also 
attended Boreel’s college include Pieter (or Peter) Balling, Jarig Jelles, Jan Rieuwertsz 
(all Mennonites), and Simon Joosten de Vries.  
Mennonites, or Dutch Anabaptists, frequently participated in Collegiant 
meetings.
123
 Jones notes that the Mennonite preacher, doctor, and national leader of the 
Dutch Collegiant movement, Galenus Abrahams (or Abrahamsz, 1622-1706), met with 
George Fox (1624-1691), the founder of the English Quakers, on three occasions that 
included a large religious convention in Amsterdam.
124
 “In spirit they were very near 
together, and with a little more insight on both sides the two movements might have 
joined into one single stream. For many years afterwards the common people, not given 
to nice distinctions, called the annual gathering of the Collegiants at Rynsburg ‘the 
meeting of the Quakers.’”125 Also known as the Enthusiasts and the Children of Light, the 
Quakers call their sect the Religious Society of Friends, a name that happens to accord 
with Spinoza’s project. Much like the Quakers, the Collegiants “encouraged the custom 
of silent waiting in their gatherings as a preparation for ‘openings.’”126 Openings are 
spontaneous utterances of Scriptural passages or similar testimonials to “the Word of 
God.” The Collegiants “proved from the fourteenth chapter of I Corinthians that free 
prophecy is the highest form of ministry … They felt that prayer accompanied by tears 
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was true prayer, ‘moved’ from above. They, however, were persons of scholarship and 
refinement, and not tumultuous or strongly emotional, but, on the contrary, they highly 
valued dignity and propriety of behavior.”127 The Collegiant and Quaker custom of 
waiting on the Word of God is also emblematic of waiting for the return of a visible 
apostolic Church.
128
 And Spinoza, having something of a zest for the role of ambassador, 
was indeed in contact with the Quaker mission, perhaps with the goal of further 
harmonizing both sects and hastening the realization of their common goals.
129
 Although 
Spinoza evidently never attended Quaker meetings, he did register an intention to do so 
with the missionary, William Ames (d. 1662). Ames was probably introduced to Spinoza 
by Peter Serrarius, also a member of Boreel’s Collegiants.130 But Ames was arrested and 
deported before the Quaker meeting that Spinoza agreed to attend took place.
131
 
 With the Quakers as a whole, Serrarius shared a strong millenarian sensibility. 
Anticipating an imminent messianic age, mid-seventeenth century millenarian Christians 
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were convinced that Jews would soon convert to Christianity en masse as a fulfillment of 
prophecy. The Quakers composed pamphlets encouraging Jews to convert, one entitled 
For Manasseth-Ben-Israel; the Call of the Jews out of Babylon, which is good tidings to 
the meek, liberty to the captives, and of opening of the prison doors, and another A 
Loving Salutation to the Seed of Abraham among the Jews, wherever they are scattered 
up and down upon the Face of the Earth. Both tracts were written in English in by the 
Quaker leader, Margaret Fell (who later married George Fox). The first, published in 
English in 1656, was a letter to Spinoza’s teacher, Menasseh ben Israel, when he traveled 
to England on a failed mission to secure legal passage of Jews back into that country.
132
 
Ames translated Fell’s letter to Menasseh ben Israel into Dutch, and in Amsterdam 
secured the services of a “a Jew…that by the Jews is Cast out (as he himself and others 
sayeth) because he owneth no other teacher but the light.” Said cast out Jew translated the 
document into Hebrew. Fell later directed John Stubbs to translate A Loving Salutation 
(first printed in English in 1657) into Dutch and Hebrew. Stubbs had converted Samuel 
Fisher (1605-1665), a graduate of Oxford who knew Greek and Hebrew, whose The 
Letter of Samuel Fisher to the Jews is appended to Fell’s A Loving Salutation. Due 
probably to his extremely active proselytizing, Fisher did not find time to translate the 
pamphlets into Hebrew himself. On their way to convert the pope in Italy and the sultan 
in Turkey, Stubbs and Fisher stopped in Amsterdam to convert the Jewish population. 
Mission reports from the time indicate that the same Dutch Jew who had translated the 
letter to Menasseh ben Israel was now translating A Loving Salutation. 
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The last half of the 1650s finds Spinoza caught up in the religious politics of 
Amsterdam.
133
 The Quaker mission had run into problems. Taking full advantage of the 
millenarian fervor prevalent at the time, James Nayler, a Quaker leader, proclaimed 
himself Jesus Christ. Although he was arrested, Nayler effectively split the Quakers into 
two camps. Ann Cargill, a zealous Naylerite, went to Holland and began disrupting 
Quaker meetings. Boreel and Serrarius scorned the Quaker turmoil, and probably 
influenced Spinoza to distance himself from them by 1658.
134
  
By that time, however, a fruitful exchange of ideas and spiritual influence had 
already begun between Spinoza, Fisher, the Collegiants, and the Quakers. “Spinoza spent 
three years (1660-1663) in the quiet village of Rynsburg, living in close and intimate 
contact with his Collegiant friends.”135 At some point in 1661/62, Pieter Balling visited 
Rijnsburg and took some of the text from Spinoza’s unfinished Treatise on the 
Improvement of the Understanding back to Amsterdam.  
Soon after, The Light Upon the Candlestick appeared in Dutch in 1662. Published 
by Rieuwertsz, this text lists the Quaker, William Ames, as the author. However, whether 
to throw off the censors or out of “characteristic Collegiant modesty,”136 scholars now 
agree that it was Balling who penned the Dutch version, Boreel who translated it into 
Latin, and a Quaker, Benjamin Furly, who translated it into English. Rieuwertsz 
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published a second Dutch edition posthumously in 1684 under Balling’s name.137 
Drawing material directly from Spinoza’s work, perhaps even as a contribution and not 
merely an influence, Popkin notes that “Balling’s pamphlet was considered important 
enough as a statement of the philosophical foundation of Quakerism” to be included in 
William Sewel’s History of the Quakers.138  
In turn, Collegiant and Quaker influence on Spinoza is evident in his texts. 
Richard Popkin discusses Spinoza’s frequent use of “Quaker terminology about spirit, 
light and inward knowledge.”139 Popkin also notes that “a very great number of the same 
points” in Samuel Fisher’s The Rustick’s Alarum to the Rabbies (1660) are found 
especially in the seventh through twelfth chapters of Spinoza’s Theological-Political 
Treatise (1670), “often with the same examples about the history of the Scriptural texts, 
the loss of the originals, the transcription problems, the problem of Hebrew vowels, the 
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human factors involved in present copies, etc.”140 The general approach to biblical 
criticism is also the same in both Fisher and Spinoza. Both affirm that Scripture is bound 
to human history, from the beginning of the Hebrew nation to the present, and that the 
true “Word of God, on the other hand, is independent of any and all human attempts to 
write it down.”141 Regarding this matter, in Chapter 12 of the Theological-Political 
Treatise, Spinoza states: “Furthermore, if, according to the saying of the Apostle in 2 
Cor. iii. 3, they possessed ‘the Epistle of Christ, written not with ink, but with the Spirit 
of the living God, not in tables of stone, but in the fleshy tables of the heart,’ let them 
cease to worship the letter, and be so anxious concerning it.”142 For Fisher, Spinoza, and 
the sects in which they moved, the Spirit of God and Christ was alive, realized in 
neighborly love and not in the veneration of letters. “This Light—the first Principle of all 
Religion,” understood in its proper historical context, is a religion-affirming idea vera 
from which all other ideas follow for Spinoza as well as his fellow spiritual Christians.
143
  
In Voorburg in 1665, Spinoza again became involved in Christian politics, this 
time erupting over a ministerial vacancy in a local Reformed church. A Collegiant (who 
sometimes rented a room to Spinoza), Daniel Tydeman, was on the replacement 
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committee, but other committee members (two local bishops, one retired) passed over 
Tydeman’s choice in favor of a more orthodox candidate, and forwarded their petition to 
the authorities in Delft. Tydeman, Spinoza, and other liberal Christians constructed an 
alternative petition that failed, not surprisingly, but not before contributing to Spinoza’s 
reputation as a negative influence in the community at large.
144
 
In his final residence, a room rented in the Hague from the Van der Spyck family, 
Spinoza held a “Lutheran preacher, a man named Cordes, in high esteem, going to hear 
him preach on occasion.”145 Spinoza frequently discussed the content of the local 
Lutheran sermons with the Van de Spyck family, even, it is reported, up until the evening 
before his death.
146
 He also affirmed to Mrs. Van de Spyck that if she practiced peace and 
piety she would be saved by her Christian faith, and encouraged the Van de Spyck 
children to go to church.
147
  
Yet, despite all of the biographic evidence, many commentators still have a 
problem believing Spinoza could have been a “practicing” Christian. Whatever 
“practicing” means, even Nadler finds the notion of Spinoza doing it “very hard to 
believe.”148 But without understanding that Spinoza’s new theology is based upon the 
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blend of Cartesian philosophy and Judeo-Christian religiosity particular to the Borellist 
Collegiants, a full assessment of the Ethics is not possible, nor is the principle tying 
together his entire project apparent. 
  54 
CHAPTER 4 
THE IMPORTANCE OF FRIENDSHIP IN THE ETHICS 
Note: In this chapter, sections of Spinoza’s Ethics are cited in italics and 
interspersed with my commentary. Parenthetical references Spinoza makes to 
other sections of the Ethics are elided, as are Latin particles Wienpahl inserts for 
clarification in his translation, found in the appendix to The Radical Spinoza. The 
ampersands Wienpahl uses in conformity with Spinoza’s original manuscripts are 
retained. Wienpahl’s translation is somewhat favored for definitions, axioms, and 
propositions. Shirley’s translation (Spinoza, Complete Works) is used for proofs, 
corollaries, and scholia. 
 
In the appendix to Part 4 of the Ethics, Spinoza states that he here gathers the 
seventy-three proofs of Part 4 “under their main headings,” in effect laying out thirty-two 
rules for “the right way of living” arranged so as to “be seen at one view.”149 The twelfth 
rule in the appendix reads: “It is of the first importance to men to establish close 
relationships and to bind themselves together with such ties as may most effectively unite 
them into one body, and, as an absolute rule, to act in such a way as serves to strengthen 
friendship.”150 Those who comply with this rule, as Spinoza expounds throughout Part 4, 
live according to the dictates of reason (ex dictu rationis). In Part 4, Proposition 37, 
Scholium 2, Spinoza acknowledges Hobbes when he states that “in order that men may 
live in harmony and help one another, it is necessary for them to give up their natural 
right and to create a feeling of mutual confidence that they will refrain from any action 
that may be harmful to another,” but only under fear of punishment. The development of 
such “States” and their “Citizens” is a matter of civil law and justice, a theme to which 
Spinoza provided a detailed account in the Theological-Political Treatise. The topic of 
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the Ethics, however, is not such civil law, but rather natural law or “the order of the 
whole of Nature.” At this more cosmic or metaphysical level, Spinoza finds that: 
“Nothing can be more in harmony with the nature of anything than other individuals of 
the same species, and so there is nothing more advantageous to man for preserving his 
own being and enjoying a rational life than a man who is guided by reason.”151 Since a 
human being must be at once a part of nature and part of some civic body or another, 
Spinoza finds that persons with common self-interested natures living together will 
strengthen each other’s abilities and fulfill each other’s natural self-interests through 
genuine friendships, while those striving to live in harmony with others unlike 
themselves will be forced to live in a most unnatural manner and to merely get along as 
best and as legally as is possible.
152
 In the Theological-Political Treatise, Spinoza argues 
that Divine Law was established in the early Hebrew state by way of imagination and 
superstition. In the Ethics, Spinoza seeks to exposit what he regards as the very same 
Divine Law from a perspective informed by empirical observation and the “natural light 
of reason,” that is, according to a worldview informed by the early modern sciences in 
which he participated.
153
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 The “idea of God” (Dei ideam) is an important double entendre running 
throughout the Ethics. In the proof to Part 1, Proposition 21, Spinoza demonstrates that 
the idea of God held in a finite (e.g., human) mind is necessarily dependent upon the 
attribute of Thought belonging to God himself.
154
 In this proof, Spinoza seeks to establish 
“the idea of God in Thought” as a kind of meeting ground for divine-human and human-
human relatedness. This is crucial since, per Part 1 (especially by the Definitions,
155
 the 
scholium to Proposition 11,
156
 Proposition 20,
157
 Propositon 34,
158
  and the first 
paragraph of the Appendix
159
), God, on an infinite scale, is a self-caused substance that 
“is by nature prior to its affections” just as, on a finite scale, the selfish endeavor to 
persist in one’s being (conatus) for an individual thing (res singularis) is the virtue prior 
to any and all other (i.e. more sociable) virtues it may possess, and also the single virtue it 
shares with all other individual things, including God himself. Thus, as the metaphysics 
of the Ethics ranges over its five parts, it descends, so to speak, from God (Part 1) to the 
human mind (Part 2) to the emotions (Part 3) to the dynamic tension between the 
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emotions and the reason (Part 4) where at last the intellect recovers its purity in the idea 
of God and begins its ascent back to the eternal perspective, to union with the divine and 
blessedness (Part 5). In Part 5 Spinoza recommends  
that in arranging our thoughts and images we should always concentrate on that 
which is good in every single thing so that in so doing we may be determined to 
act always from the emotion of pleasure…The mind can bring it about that all of 
the affections of the body—i.e. images of things—be related to the idea of God. 
There is no affection of the body of which the mind cannot form a clear and 
distinct conception, and so the mind can bring it about that they should all be 
related to the idea of God.
160
 
Thus, the idea of God is the pivot upon which Spinoza’s ethics and theory of blessedness 
revolve. On this head Spinoza concludes: 
Hence it follows that God, insofar as he loves himself, loves mankind, and, 
consequently, that the love of God toward men and the mind’s intellectual love 
toward God are one and the same. From this we clearly understand in what our 
salvation or blessedness or freedom consists, namely, in the constant and eternal 
love toward God, that is, in God’s love toward men. This love or blessedness is 
called glory in the Holy Scriptures, and rightly so. For whether this love be related 
to God or to the mind, it can properly be called spiritual contentment, which in 
reality cannot be distinguished from glory.
161
 
In Spinoza’s account, as more and more people bond together in social harmony, or in the 
spirit of friendship, the more they will come to resemble the idea or image of God. 
 
Ethics 4, Proposition 20     The more each endeavors, & is able to seek what is 
useful to him, that is, to conserve his be-ing, the more he is endowed with virtue; 
& on the contrary in so far as each neglects what is useful to him, that is, to 
conserve his be-ing, he is to that extent impotent.
162
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This proposition elaborates a key notion upon which Spinoza’s ethical theory is 
constructed, namely self-interest. God’s self-love, the ultimate expression of self-interest, 
is reflected in different degrees in every individual thing. Human self-interest is, of 
course, the foundation upon which Hobbes built his philosophy. It is a notion which, as a 
realist, Spinoza could hardly refute. But Spinoza takes the premise in a much different 
direction.  
 
Ethics 4, Proposition 26, Proof     The conatus to preserve itself is nothing but 
the essence of a thing, which, insofar as it exists as such, is conceived as having a 
force to persist in existing and to do those things that necessarily follow from its 
given nature. But the essence of reason is nothing other than our mind insofar as 
it clearly and distinctly understands. Therefore, whatever we endeavor according 
to reason is nothing else but to understand. Again, since this conatus of the mind, 
wherewith the mind, insofar as it exercises reason, endeavors to preserve its own 
being is nothing else but a conatus to understand, this conatus to understand is 
therefore the primary and only basis of virtue, and it is not for some further 
purpose that we endeavor to understand things. On the contrary, the mind, 
insofar as it exercises reason, cannot conceive any good for itself except what is 
conducive to understanding.
163
  
 
In Spinoza’s account, each and every individual thing (res singularis), whether a 
stone, an animal body, or a nation, seeks to persist in its own being (conatus). In Part 4, 
Proposition 22, Spinoza identifies this seeking to persist in one’s own being not only as a 
virtue but as the prius of all other virtues. In Proposition 24 Spinoza identifies the seeking 
of one’s own advantage “under the guidance” (Shirley) or “according to the conduct” 
(Wienpahl) of reason (ex dictu rationis) as conforming to virtue. In practice and effect, 
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then, all virtue according to Spinoza “is nothing other than to act, to live, [and] to 
conserve one’s be-ing (these three signify the same).”164 In its seeking an understanding 
of God, the mind considered under the attribute of Thought (established in Part 2, 
Proposition 1) is found by Spinoza to be an ultimate expression of primal self-advantage-
seeking or self-preserving virtue. 
 
Ethics 4, Proposition 28     A Mind’s highest good is God’s knowledge, & a 
Mind’s highest virtue is to cognize God.165  
 
 In the proof to this proposition, Spinoza claims that God, “an absolutely infinite 
being, and one without whom nothing can be or be conceived,”166 is the penultimate 
object of the mind’s understanding. Spinoza claims: that the mind is only active when 
understanding; that only when understanding can the mind “be said without qualification 
to act from virtue,”167 and that God is the most beneficial object that can be understood 
by a mind. From these premises Spinoza concludes that “the highest virtue of the mind is 
to understand or to know God.”168 In Proposition 26 Spinoza defines understanding as 
“Whatever we endeavor according to reason.”169 In the proof to Proposition 27, Spinoza 
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further explores understanding as an unfolding of conatal virtue, claiming that “the mind 
possesses no certainty save insofar as it exercises reason.”170 Because the mind, in this 
account, is only active when seeking understanding, it is attracted only to those things 
that improve its power, because only those things are self-beneficial. In fact, according to 
Spinoza, the only “certain” criterion by which a mind judges other things to be good or 
evil is “that which really conduces to understanding, or which can impede our 
understanding.”171 The importance of the mental virtue of understanding God in 
Proposition 28 will again come into play in Proposition 35.  
 
Ethics 4, Proposition 29     Any singular thing whatever, whose nature is entirely 
diverse from ours, can neither help, nor coerce our potency for acting, & 
absolutely no thing can be good, or ill for us, unless it has something common 
with us.
172
 
 
Here, again, Spinoza discusses singular things, stating that any singular thing 
whatever (res quaecunque singularis) must have something in common with us, for 
example, scale or, even more importantly, contemporaneous existence, in order for it to 
be able to interact with or affect us. Singular things from the past such as cultural 
artefacts or accounts of particular people documented through various media can in 
different ways affect our lives now, but a particular person or even a small tribe of whom 
no record exists who lived in the past are “singular things” which can have no positive or 
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negative effect on our understanding and therefore cannot affect our behavior for better 
or worse. Those things that do have a commonality with us, and most especially those 
things that share with us a contemporaneous existence, can affect us and cause us to act. 
Such singular things necessarily attract or repel us, and thus we act towards them with 
either a friendly or unfriendly regard. 
Since God exists and human beings exist,
173
 Proposition 29 also affirms that God 
“has something in common with us.” Since God has infinite power,174 nothing else can 
“coerce our potency for acting” or be as good for us as God.  
 
Ethics 4, Proposition 31     In so far as some thing agrees with our nature, to that 
extent it is necessarily good.
175
 
 
In the corollary to this proposition, Spinoza establishes the idea that things are 
more advantageous to us the more they agree with our own nature, that is, with our own 
self-interest. In Propositions 32-34, Spinoza argues that passive (i.e., non-rational or 
inconstant) emotions cause disagreements between the natures of individuals.  
 
Ethics 4, Proposition 35     In so far as human beings live according to the 
conduct of reason, to that extent only do they always necessarily agree (in) 
nature.
176
 
                                                 
173
 Proof to E1p28: “nothing exists but substance and its modes” (Spinoza, Complete Works, 233). 
Also: E1a1, E1p7, 15 & 20. 
174
 Part 1, see esp. Prop. 9 & Appendix. 
175
 Wienpahl, The Radical Spinoza, 236. 
176
 Wienpahl, The Radical Spinoza, 236. 
  62 
 
 For Spinoza, human beings are necessarily in agreement with one another when 
they live ex dictu rationis. Spinoza draws several consequences from this proposition. In 
Corollary 1, he states: “There is no individual thing in the universe more advantageous to 
man than a man who lives by the guidance of reason.”177  In Corollary 2 he adds: “It is 
when every man is most devoted to seeking his own advantage that men are of most 
advantage to one another.”178 And in the scholium he cites a “common saying: ‘Man is a 
God to man’,” but laments that jealousy and mutual dislike plague the general disposition 
of most human beings.  
On the balance, however, Spinoza finds that the “mutual help” of social life is a 
good thing for human beings. In the fourteenth rule in the appendix to Part 4, Spinoza 
reiterates: “So although men for the most part allow lust to govern all their actions, the 
advantages that follow from living in their society far exceed the disadvantages. 
Therefore it is better to endure their injuries with patience, and to apply oneself to such 
measures as promote harmony and friendship.”179 Furthermore, in Proposition 35 of Part 
4, Spinoza begins developing the idea that a human knowledge or understanding of God 
is best sought through community with others, and that such community is a part—
actually the most important part for human beings—of God’s infinite understanding of 
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Love, a notion that, as has already been noted, Spinoza more fully expounds towards the 
end of the Ethics.  
 
Ethics 4, Proposition 36     The highest good of those, who follow virtue 
continuously, is common to all, and all can be equally joyful (in) it.
180
 
 
 In Proposition 36 Spinoza finds that people who follow their self-interest through 
to its logical conclusion produce a highest good (summum bonum), a knowledge of God 
through the dictates of reason that embraces all of humanity, a knowledge that 
theoretically can be enjoyed by all without being diminished.
181
  
 
Ethics 4, Proposition 37     A good, for which each who follows virtue 
continuously has an appetite for himself, he will desire for the rest of human 
beings, & the more, as he will have greater God’s knowledge.182 
 
 Taking this next logical step, Spinoza identifies a kind of intellectual amor 
insatiabilis. The more a person knows God, the more that person wants to share that 
knowledge of God with others. In the first scholium to Proposition 37, Spinoza makes 
this summum bonum explicit:  
Whatever we desire to do, whereof we are the cause insofar as we have the idea of 
God, that is, insofar as we know God, I refer to Religion [religio]…Again, the 
desire to establish friendship with others, a desire that characterizes the man who 
lives by the guidance of reason, I call Sense of Honor [honestas]; and I use the 
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term “honorable” for what is praised by men who live by the guidance of reason, 
and “base” for what is opposed to the establishing of friendship.183 
According to the proof to Part 4, Proposition 73, there are three things that are 
synonymous: seeking self-advantage under the guidance of reason; living freely; and the 
desire “to take account of the life and the good of the community.”184 In the scholium to 
Part 3, Proposition 59, Spinoza states “By means of Generosity…I understand a Desire 
by which each solely according to reason’s dictate endeavors to help the remaining 
human beings, & join them to him in friendship.”185 In the proof to Proposition 71, 
Spinoza states “Only free men are truly advantageous to one another and united by the 
closest bond of friendship, and are equally motivated by love in endeavoring to benefit 
one another.”186 Friendship, in the Ethics, is thus the bond between free people, those 
who have joined reason to the primal urge for self-preservation; it is the very content of 
the idea of God insofar as God’s idea concerns human beings. 
Free people are friends to humanity and have some important distinguishing 
characteristics, according to Spinoza. These include: cheerfulness;
187
 an ability to answer 
the unfriendliness of others with “Love, or Generosity”188 to the extent possible, i.e., as 
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far as such returns of kindliness do not bring harm to oneself or others;
189
 a concomitant 
wisdom in choosing when to stand ground and when to retreat;
190
 and the ability to make 
sacrifices in the present for a greater future outcome.
191
 In summary, “The strong-minded 
man hates nobody, is angry with nobody, envies nobody, is indignant with nobody, 
despises nobody, and is no way prone to pride.”192 Thus for Spinoza, in the idea of God, 
all strong and free individual have these characteristics in common the more they come to 
know God. 
 
Ethics 4, Proposition 40     Things which conduce to human beings’ common 
Society, or which effect it, that human beings live in concord, are useful; those on 
the contrary ill, which induce discord into a Civic Body.
193
 
 
 Why does this short Proposition, with an equally succinct proof, follow a much 
longer proposition (Proposition 39) about the proportions of “motion-and-rest” of the 
human body? In the appendix to Part 4, Spinoza states that the proofs in this part of the 
work are “scattered so as to meet the convenience of logical deduction one from 
another.”194 This suggests a logical progression between the propositions in question, in 
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which notions about the civic body may be inferred from notions about the human body. 
The analogy is indeed clear, and in the context of the early modern “bodies within 
bodies” cosmography that Spinoza, Boyle, Conway, and Leibniz helped construct, 
relevant to Spinoza’s theory of friendship.  
 In the proof to Part 4, Proposition 39, Spinoza defines the constitution of the form 
of a human body as consisting “in this, that its parts communicate their motions to one 
another in a certain fixed proportion.”195 In a healthy human body, this fixed ratio of 
motion-and-rest (motûs, & quietis ratio) conserves itself and (per Proposition 38) allows 
a person to interact with more and more of her environment, thereby increasing her 
power and virtue. Anything that disturbs a body’s ratio of motion and rest to the extent of 
negatively impacting its ability to interact with its environment brings about deleterious 
health effects and “is, therefore, bad.”196 The essential ingredient in Propositions 38 and 
39, i.e. the interactive property of physical proportions of motion-and-rest, adumbrate 
what is known in contemporary science as kinesthetic intelligence. Three closely related 
consequences follow from this premise.  
First, Spinoza’s deduction of Proposition 40 (on the civic body) from Proposition 
39 (on the human body) becomes more fully apparent.
197
 In fact, the maintenance of 
motion and rest “communicated” by the parts of the human body are, in the analogous 
civic body, communicated by way of relational patterns, the stability of which Spinoza 
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has identified as friendship. That friendships in civic bodies actually involve verbal, 
textual, gestural, and other performative communication also helps make clear this 
analogy between human body and civic body. Where communication in either a human 
or civic body is most harmonious or friendly, it is most stable, and endures for the longest 
possible period of time. 
Second, stable ratios of motion and rest can be recorded in a thriving human body, 
i.e. by way of genetic semiosis, or, likewise, in a thriving civic body by way of legal and 
spiritual traditions.
198
 Thus, by Spinoza’s account, the interactive ratios of motion and 
rest of mythical and historic figures, spiritual teachers, and other exemplars can resonate 
throughout the customs and practices of civic bodies and the human bodies that comprise 
them. 
Thirdly, in the context of the notions of Divine (or natural) Law and the idea of 
God, there are no indications in Spinoza’s writings that nature places a limit upon the 
endurance of a given ratio of motion-and-rest of an individual thing or upon that thing’s 
physical Extension or ability to interact with its environment. Indeed, quite the contrary, 
the theories of blessedness
199
 and of immortality
200
 found in the Ethics entail both 
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interspecies communication and divine-human relatedness. The most recent trend in 
Spinoza scholarship has picked up on this in the context of “biopolitics”201 and, pace 
Mack, a kind of teleological autoimmunity that can (through history and current events) 
be observed taking place in civic bodies. “From the perspective of self-interest, the 
defensive reaction of warlike behavior is not an option; rather friendship truly instantiates 
the dictates of self-preservation (conatus).”202 Pain in a body, dissention in a group, wars, 
natural disasters, and the like all herald recalibrations of equilibria in adjacent individuals 
and scales. When Dutch and other European powers suddenly found themselves part of a 
much larger world, Spinoza’s ethical project called for an account of the value of 
friendship in human affairs. The theories of blessedness and of immortality in Spinoza’s 
work and the commentaries that draw upon it suggest that, when able to move past envy 
and jealousy, the human soul is able to enjoy an undying union with the divine by way of 
seeking communion in friendship with all other be-ings.  
Again, towards the end of the Ethics, Spinoza reiterates the importance of religion 
to society and the repayment of human ugliness with kindness: 
 
Ethics, Part 5, Proposition 41     Even if we did not know that our mind is 
eternal, we should still regard as being of prime importance piety and religion 
and, to sum up completely, everything which in Part IV we showed to be related 
to courage and nobility.
203
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In this reading of the Ethics, contentment is not a Stoic abandonment for Spinoza, but 
rather a highly active involvement in one’s community of friends.204 “For blessedness is 
nothing other than that self-contentment that arises from the intuitive knowledge of 
God.”205 According to Spinoza, we cannot have any knowledge of particular things 
(“ideas from which” the human mind “perceives itself, its own body, and external 
bodies”) without first having “an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence 
of God.”206 In Spinoza’s account, the adequate  knowledge of all individual things thus 
begins with God and trickles down, as it were, through cosmic bodies, civic bodies, and 
families,
207
 through human bodies and even deeper into their constituent parts and other 
smaller bodies. Bonds of friendship, of every conceivable degree and combination, hold 
all of these individuals together.
208
 Thus bonded throughout all eternity, the bodies of all 
these individual things comprise the idea of God, the idea vera from which Spinoza’s 
ethical system departs and to which it returns. 
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CHAPTER 5 
SPINOZA’S NEW THEOLOGY: AN INTERPRETATION 
N.B. In Prop. 35 [of the Ethics, Part III] “Friendship” is the name of an Affection 
by reason of its capital letter. BdS nowhere discusses friendship as an Affection. 
In Descartes’ The Passions of the Soul it is a passion. Later in the ETHIC 
“Amicitia” is not capitalized. This may be an unfinished aspect of the ETHIC.  
—Paul Wienpahl, The Radical Spinoza209 
 
As literary devices, the philosophical terms in the Ethics such as substance, 
attributes, modes, etc. have a partly mythological character; a fact about which Spinoza 
was not unaware. However, if the yarn Spinoza spins with these terms has, at bottom, an 
irreducible fictional element that puts it in a category with all other forms of storytelling, 
Spinoza also has the distinction of presenting his story as a scientific theory. In the form 
of a natural theology, the Ethics thus heralds at once the productive nature of science and 
the demonstrability of enduring religious values.    
As a traditional Abrahamic monotheistic theologian, Spinoza affirms the supreme 
and divine nature of Love.
210
 Love of God and love of fellow human beings are, for him, 
distinct but not different kinds of love. But as an early modern logician, epistemologist, 
ontologist, and natural scientist, Spinoza also argues that friendship is the yardstick of 
social homeostasis, or that friendship is the measure of all individual things. These 
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approaches taken together led Spinoza to conclude that friendship marks the point of 
contact or the tipping point where eternal indeterminate substance, “the infinite love 
wherewith God loves himself,” expresses itself as the determined affections of temporal 
relationships. The moral of Spinoza’s story is: Friendship is the measure of Love.  
In this context, the self-equilibrating individual emerges as the hero of the story. 
For Spinoza, the various roles of the self-equilibrating individual as if constituting 
Nature, being understood as God, substance, etc. depend entirely upon its functioning as 
a recursively self-referential definition. Following the Aristotelian tradition, Spinoza 
treats the definition of a thing as the rational, intellectual, or otherwise explicative 
equivalent of its essence. Following al-Ghazali, Abraham ibn Daud, and Maimonides, 
God’s essence is inconceivable and unidirectionally causal. Hence, no true definition of 
God is possible.
211
 But the definition of God in the Ethics, being an idea of or placeholder 
for God’s true definition or essence—that is, an idea of an Idea—is still clearer and more 
adequate an idea than any other, in Spinoza’s account, and precisely the one upon which 
all other of his definitions, proofs, and other ontological assertions depend.
212
 “To argue 
that infinite things have the most perfect definitions is extremely radical, it implies that 
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the essential definitions of infinite beings are fully rationally accessible.”213 Yet this is 
precisely what Spinoza claimed. 
Spinoza dared take such a bold step because he intended his explication of God in 
the Ethics as a rational counterpart for a true knowledge of God. The rational account 
rests upon Spinoza’s second kind of knowledge, reason; “Logical proofs are the eyes of 
the mind.”214 But a true knowledge of God depends on Spinoza’s third kind of 
knowledge, scientific intuition, which entails a direct encounter with and understanding 
of God’s perfection. It does not matter that we do not know God’s essence as only God 
himself can know it, according to Spinoza, because we know what his essence is to every 
being other than himself, i.e., to every creature. The equilibrating individual, a friend to 
humanity, as a circumscribed topic comes alive as the hero in Spinoza’s story, the 
essential first principle from which all else follows.
215
 The Ethics is Spinoza’s instruction 
manual for the intuition of this first principle, and its five parts he demonstrates that the 
knowledge of friendship is the knowledge of God. 
According to Spinoza, God attends to the causal order and connection of all that 
ever has and ever will transpire as one single and unchanging equilibrium. In the 
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correspondence with Henry Oldenburg, Spinoza gives us a window into this notion. 
Although Spinoza and Oldenburg were friends, their countries were embroiled in 
constant maritime hostilities and violent colonial competition, complex politics, and mass 
hysteria. The chaos threatened the lives and freedom of both of these philosophers to 
such a degree that, during one particularly uncertain period, Oldenburg spent two months 
in the Tower of London. Amidst these strained English-Dutch relations of the mid-1660s, 
Spinoza wrote to Oldenburg: 
For I do not think it right to laugh at nature, and far less to grieve over it, 
reflecting that men, like all else, are only a part of nature, and that I do not know 
how each part of nature harmonises with the whole, and how it coheres with other 
parts. And I realize that it is merely through such lack of understanding that 
certain features of nature—which I thus perceived only partly and in a 
fragmentary way, and which are not in keeping with our philosophical attitude of 
mind—once seemed to me vain, disordered, and absurd. But now I let everyone 
go his own way. Those who wish can by all means die for their own good, as long 
as I am allowed to live for truth.
216
 
Seeing the nondual character of all things in nature as at once semi-equilibrated singular 
things and bodies-within-bodies, Spinoza believed that whatever appeared to us locally, 
in our room or on our planet, as “vain, disordered, and absurd” was, regardless of such 
appearance, necessary to the functioning of other scales of organic activity beyond our 
purview.  
Aware of the equilibria in (and between) organisms, Spinoza noted their purest 
form in the bodies of children at play, and their nature in general which he described as 
cheerfulness (hilaritas).
217
 “Cheerfulness is pleasure which, insofar as it is related to the 
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body, consists in this, that all parts of the body are affected equally; that is, the body’s 
power of activity is increased or assisted in such a way that all parts maintain the same 
proportion of motion-and-rest toward one another.”218 An individual (res singularis) for 
Spinoza was any persisting ratio of motion-and-rest, in which the parts of that individual 
communicated with one another in order to maintain equilibrium, or a continuing 
cheerful existence.
219
 Not only a person but also a loving couple or group of good friends 
thus constitute an equilibrated individual for Spinoza. According to his definition, other 
examples of cheerful individuals that would have been available to Spinoza’s personal 
experience include: the tireless activity of a bee hive, the shalom bayis of a Jewish home, 
the shared feeling of the Holy Spirit in a Christian congregation, and the peace and 
prosperity of a strong sovereign state.  
Since the Cartesian plenum, as understood by Spinoza and his colleagues, is the 
system of nature as a whole in a constant-state equilibrium, an ultimate cheerfulness must 
logically follow from it, of which the cheerfulness of the equilibria of all other 
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individuals are a measure.
220
 How the translation of equilibria from the infinite individual 
to finite individuals takes place is found in Part I, Definition 5 (the definition of modes): 
“By means of mode I understand affections of a substance, or that, which is in another, by 
means of which also it is conceived.”221 From the assumed eternal perspective, this “in 
another” where affections are conceived is God’s Idea (of himself), wherein the human-
human relationships occur. A human idea of this Idea is a point of contact with the 
divine; it constitutes the divine-human relationship (from the side of a human), and, for 
Spinoza, discharges the need for faith in an unknowable God.
222
 According to Spinoza 
the affections of substance occur at once: (a) in the human mind, embedded as it is in the 
infinite regress of transitive causes (all other individuals); and (b) in the mind of God 
whose affections immediately and immanently translate an eternal steady-state Affection 
(some kind of infinite and indeterminate cheerfulness
223
) into a full range of possible 
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emotions, the uniqueness of each one of which is crafted, so to speak, to match whatever 
is the case in an embodied experience. The self-loving bond between God and his Idea 
and the bond between every creature with every other creature is thus the same bond seen 
from two different perspectives.  
The scholium to Proposition 29 of Part III defines the quality of a kind character, 
according to Spinoza: “This conatus to do, and also to avoid doing, something simply in 
order to please men…is called Kindliness [humanitas].”224 It is through kindliness that 
the love of neighbor as self and the union with God in his Image occur.
225
 For Spinoza, to 
mentally experience our kindliness towards others exclusively as God’s grace is the only 
self-caused activity available to human beings and constitutes what he calls “spiritual 
contentment” as well as “glory” in the scriptural sense.226 This only free mental decision 
on the part of humans has the power to “keep our lusts in check,”227 meaning that we do 
not experience kindliness as coming from our big generous hearts, making us worthy of 
some reward, but instead as coming from God’s Idea alone, where all interactive 
causation and God’s existence-causation meet. In God’s Idea, reasoned Spinoza, 
kindliness spontaneously arises in our relations with others and not, as we imagine, from 
our own volition.  
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Seeking understanding, this affection can become stronger, and an individual can 
grow closer in friendship to God through her relationships with other creatures.
228
 But the 
feeling of affirmation or negation itself continues to spontaneously arise in given 
relationships of its own accord, as the affections of a sole substance. And when 
examined, according to Spinoza, attraction and repulsion, the affirmation and negation 
related to the physicality of emotions, are found to be spontaneous and necessary rather 
than a product of free will.
229
 Whether in God or in human beings, free will is redundant 
to Spinoza, and he dismisses it from his philosophy.
230
 In this account, which historically 
has been counterintuitive to many, our friendships and even our own humanitas are gifts 
of God’s grace to be received in piety, with joy and with thanks. Doing so, Spinoza 
assures, leads to a happy and ethical life. 
                                                 
228
 This is the meaning of E1p9: “The more reality or being a thing has, the more attributes it has” 
(Spinoza, Complete Works, 221). See also Goldstein, Betraying Spinoza, 181. 
229
 See appendix to E1: God “is one alone … is and acts solely from the necessity of his own 
nature … [and] is the free cause of all things” (Spinoza, Complete Works, 238).  
230
 E1p21 to the end of Part 1. 
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